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This thesis examines the economic, political, and military-
implications of rapidly changing demographic trends in the Soviet
Union, with particular emphasis upon manpower issues. The
analysis offers a number of forecasts concerning the likely direction
of future military and economic policy in the training and utilization
of Soviet manpower resources. The hypothesis offered is that demo-
graphic variables will act to reduce the quality, effectiveness,
reliability, and motivation of the Soviet Armed Forces. Although
reductions in the size of the military force are not forecasted,
demographic realities will impose formidable constraints upon any
attempts at force expansion for the remainder of the century. The
paper concludes with a brief discussion of national security consid-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The challenges facing the Soviet leadership in the remaining decades
of this century will be enormous and will surely test the mettle of the
Soviet political system. Increasing economic difficulties accompanied,
for the first time, by short term inadequacies in oil production will
limit what once seemed an endless reserve of investment capital.
Traditionally, massive annual inputs of capital and labor have resulted
in enviable economic growth; but these sources are drying up and
productivity has failed to keep pace. Economic stagnation in the very
near future is a distinct possibility.
The operation of demographic variables in the years since World *
War II has created a situation in which the Slavic nationalities are
declining relative to the burgeoning Moslem populations of Central
Asia and the Caucasus. The Western republics are aging and will
suffer an absolute decline in the size of the able-bodied cohorts, while
the population of the "Southern Tier" shows strong demographic growth.
By the year 2000, one out of every four Soviet citizens will be a Central
Asian of Turko-Moslem origin, with the proportion substantially higher
in the younger age groups. The continued resistance of these peoples
to linguistic and cultural assimilation, migration from traditional
homelands, and "Sovietization" bears enormous implications for the
future of this multi-ethnic empire. **~
This paper will examine the economic, political, and military im-
plications of these demographic trends, with particular emphasis upon

manpower issues. The analysis offers a number of forecasts con-
cerning the likely direction of future military and economic policy in
the training and utilization of Soviet manpower resources. The
hypothesis offiered is that demographic variables will act to reduce
the quality, effectiveness, reliability, and motivation of the Soviet
Armed Forces. Although reductions in the size of the military force
are not forecasted, demographic realities will impose formidable
constraints upon any attempts at force expansion for the remainder
of the century.
This analysis focuses upon demographic variables because they
will serve as the basic source of future economic and military strength.
In numerous sectors, the demographic situation will provide constraints
which absolutely limit the level of success which government programs
can hope to attain. Although demographics are not likely to dictate
military or foreign policy, demographic considerations will impose
severe constraints which effectively limit the range of viable alter-
natives. It is with this consideration in mind that the author approaches
the study of demographic trends and the Soviet Armed Forces.
10

II. DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION
A. DEMOGRAPHICS
L. M. Volodarsky, Doctor of Economics and Director of the
U. S.S.R. Central Statistical Administration, reported in the February
1980 edition of Economycheskaya gazeta that "There are 265 million
of us, " reflecting the fact that as of 1 January 1980 the population of
the Soviet Union had exceeded 264. 5 million. The Director goes on
to note the proud achievements of the socialist state in raising the per-
centage of individuals employed in the national economy and in maintaining
progress toward increased urbanization and universal education. In
discussing population structure and growth, however, Volodarsky fails
to mention the degree to which the Soviet population of 1980 is the product
of the violent demographic history of the young socialist state and the
result of well recognized demographic processes occurring in virtually
all modern, developed nations. In many respects, the demographic
status of the Soviet Union is remarkably similar to that of the United
States and Western Europe; while in other respects, the Soviet popu-
lation is unique among the populations of the world. To understand
fully the structure and activity of Soviet population and population
growth, it becomes necessary to study both the impact of
L. M. Volodarsky, "Our Soviet People, "Economycheskaya
gazeta
,
No. 7, February 1980, pp. 12-13. in Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, Vol. 32, No. 7, p. 12.
11

historical events and the operation of the various socioeconomic
variables which determine present and future growth. ——
-
Table 1-1 provides a compendium of estimated and projected
population pyramids for the Russian Empire/Soviet Union during
the period 1897 to 2000. The 1897 pyramid demonstrates the well
balanced age-sex ratio with which the Russian Empire started the ZOth
Century. The pyramid which emerged by 1959, however, was severely
distorted, representing the demographic impact of World War I, the
Civil War and famine of the 1920's, the pre- war collectivization, the
purges of the late 1930's, and the heavy losses of World War II. 2
i
It has been estimated that in the period 1914 to 1921 alone, the total
of severe population losses inflicted upon the Soviet Union through
war, revolution, emigration, and famine was 26 million. * The
pyramids for 1970 and 2000 demonstrate the decline in birth rates
which first developed in the 1960's as a result of urbanization, in-
creases in the standard of living, and the substantial participation of
women in the national economy.
^Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapaway, "Soviet Population and
Manpower Trends and Policies, " in U.S. C. Joint Economic Committee,
The Soviet Economy in a New Perspective, 1976, pp. 115-121. (J842-25)
^Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of An Empire, (New York:





































































Table 1-2 provides an explanatory breakout of Soviet population
growth in the ZOth century. 4 Most noticeable is the absolute decline »
—
in population as a result of World War II, which occurred in spite of
substantial territorial expansion that tended to reduce somewhat the
demographic impact of the loss of 7 million soldiers and 13 million
civilians. The period 1950 to 1959 was characterized in the Soviet
Union, as in Western industrialized nations, by an uncharacteristic
rise in the birth rate and strong demographic growth. The chart
clearly demonstrates the decline in birth rate which followed in the
current period (1959-1979).
In many respects, the census results for 1970 were shocking to
the Soviet leadership. The census indicated a clear reversal in the
earlier trends toward rapid population growth and Russian demographic
strength, touching off a national debate on regional economic and
nationality policies which is still active at the current time. The
gravest concerns were the apparent decline in the rate of birth and
natural increase, and the clear trend toward massive regional dis-
parities unfavorable to the Slavic nationalities. It also became
apparent that these trends would accellerate, forecasting serious
dislocations in the decades ahead. These trends, combined with the
presence of emerging cultural and nationalistic sentiments, carry
important consequences for the maintenance of future economic and
military strength.
Table 1-2 was constructed utilizing data from the preliminary
results of the 1979 census; in Current Digest of the Soviet Press
,




POPULATION AND GROWTH RATES
BY HISTORICAL PERIOD
1897 - 1979
Period Characteristics Population Annual
of the period at end of period Growth
in millions Rate %








1939-1950 World War II 181.7 0.49
Reconstruction
1950-1959 Continuation of 208.8 1.76
Reconstruction
1959-1970 Period of Complete 241.7 1.34
Peace




Table 1-3 visualizes birth rate trends in the Soviet Union since
1950, projecting beyond the current period to the year 2000.
The rapid decline in the natural increase per 1000 population is _
alarming and results in a rate of population growth which in the year
2000 is only about one-third the rate experienced at mid century.
The clear implication of this trend is that the Soviet Union, which
is already experiencing shortages of personnel to maintain an ade-
quate supply of labor, will suffer even further demographic
dislocations, reducing the probability of sufficient labor resources
to maintain economic growth (in the absence of uncharacteristic
gains in productivity).
The decline of natural increase is clearly the result of two
contributing trends: a falling birth rate and a rising death rate. •—
The decreased rate of births per 1000 population first reached notice-
able proportions in the 1960's. As in other developed nations, the
decline is partially explained by the increased urbanization of society
and an increased standard of living. In urban societies, shortages
in living space and the desire for an increasing quality of life tend
to reduce the size of family which is desired by couples in the fertile
age cohorts. Urbanization is also correilated with rising educational
standards characterized by increased participation of females in the
work force and less traditional attitudes regarding family planning,
abortion, birth control, etc. The Soviet Union has experienced a









Year Births Deaths Increase
1950 26.7 9.7 17.0
I960 24. 9 7. 1 17. 8
1970 17.4 8.2 9.2
1980 19.2 9.3 9.9
1990 17.3 9.8 7.5
2000 16.0 10.2 5.8
17

phenomenal rate of industrialization and urbanization transforming
a 67% rural society in 1940 into a modern society which is 62%
urban and 38% rural. As a leading Soviet economist and demo-
grapher has recently pointed out, the forces affecting the birthrate
have been assisted by the removal of all restrictions on the avail-
ability of contraceptives and abortions in the country, as well as
a widespread acceptance of family planning and divorce.
"
l Another
factor affecting fertility which is peculiar to the Soviet Union and
other socialist states is the large percentage of women employed
in the national economy. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
reports that nearly 90% of all women in the ages 16-54 are partici-
pating in the labor force on a regular basis. " (50% in U.S. )
The Soviet leadership has instituted a number of policies designed
to stimulate the birthrate such as increasing the number of day-care
facilities, providing "aid for children" payments of 12 rubles per
child per month to low income families, partially paying a woman's
salary during a period of one years maternity leave, and granting
titles such as "Heroine Mother" for mothers of large families. 9
6U.S.S.R. Central Statistical Administration, "Preliminary
Results of the 1979 Census," Pravda, April 22, 1979, p. 4. in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol.31, No. 16, p. 1.
• L. Y. Darsky, "Social and Demographic Research Problems of
the Birthrate," in Sotsiologicheskiye issledovania
,
No. 3, July-Sep
1979, p. 10. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol.31, No. 35,
P-
I.
8 Admiral Turner, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and
China
,
Part 5, U.S.C. Joint Economic Committee, 1979, p. 8.




It is unlikely that these incentives will provide substantial input
into the stream of births, and the leadership must be careful that
such policies do not result in short-term labor force reductions. Also
impacting upon the overall birthrate is a recent increase in the rate of
infant mortality. From 1971 to 1974, there has been an unexpected,
yet significant, rise in infant mortality from a figure of 22. 9 in 1971
to 27.9 deaths per 1000 live births by the end of the period. l0 This
increase has yet to be explained and it is not clear if it is a temporary
condition or an indication of a long term trend. Grossman indicates
that overall fertility will remain somewhat stable while the number
of females in the prime childbearing ages will decline as a share of the
total population. * * This represents the conclusion that a fairly small
percentage of the female population will have numerous children while
the remainder will choose to have few or none. This trend takes on
added significance when viewed in a regional perspective.
The rapid rise in the death rate which will contribute substantially
to a declining rate of natural increase is largely a function of a shift
in the age structure toward the older age groups. The aging of the
population will affect the crude death rate despite the achievement of
acceptable life expectancies. This substantially eliminates the
achievement of increased population growth through increased life
10 Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit.
, p. 116.
Gregory Grossman, "The Labor Supply Contraints and Responses,"
in Holland Hunter, The Future of the Soviet Economy, (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1978) p. 142.




expectancies as the figures in this area seem to have peaked. The
rising number of deaths is taking a particularly heavy toll on the
older male population. In the Soviet Union, there is a difference of
10 years in the life expectancies of males and females: 64 and 74 years
1 ^
respectively. J In only one other country of the world is the known
difference reported to be this high (Ghana). It would appear that more
research is needed before substantive conclusions can be offered con-
cerning the cause of the low male life expectancies. In addition to the
lingering effects of World War II other explanations might include wide-
spread alcoholism, poor safety environment in mining and heavy industry,
and casualties during military training. Table 1-4 provides the data
concerning the age distribution of the Soviet population since 1950 and
projected until 2000. 14
TABLE 1-4
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
BY AGE GROUP: 1950-2000 (%)
AGE GROUP 1950 I960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0-15 years 32.2 31.8 30. 7 26. 1 27.0 25.2
16-59/54 years + 57.4 55.7 54.2 58.3 55.4 55.5
69/55 years and older + 10.4 12.4 15.1 15.5 17.6 19.2






As a whole then, the Soviet population can be described as an aging
population subject to rapidly decreasing rates of growth over the next
20 years. Furthermore, there appear to be few available alternatives
to halt the current trends, as they are based primarily upon complex
variables which have either been determined in the past or which function
in processes that are substantially independent of government legislation.
In this respect alone, however, the experience of the Soviet Union will
not be vastly different from that of the United States and Western Europe.
It is only when demographic variables are viewed in a regional perspec-
tive that Soviet population problems take on a particularly distinctive
character. The regional disparities are most notable in the areas of
birthrate and migratory pattern; although cultural, linguistic, and edu-
cational differences abound.
For the purpose of demographic analysis, the nationalities of the
Soviet Union may be roughly divided into two groups: the "Soviet" Euro-
peans of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics; and
the Turko-Moslem nationalities of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the
Caucasus. The regional distribution of the various nationalities, the
current and projected patterns of migration, the birthrate disparities,
and the degree of cultural/linguistic assimilation of the non-Slavic ele-
ments combine to portray the image of a rapidly changing society of a
multiethnic character. In the discussion which follows, the quantitative
issues will be discussed first, followed by an examination of cultural-
linguistic considerations; for although Russians, Ukrainians, and other
European nationalities may be grouped together by birthrate trends an,d
historical patterns of migration, nationality differences and cultural dis-
parities require that each be considered separately.

The Slavic nationalities of Russia (R. S. F. S. R. ), the Ukraine, and
Belorussia comprise the vast majority of the population and have
historically demonstrated acceptable patterns of demographic growth.
However, the 1970 census indicated that the previous balance between
Slavs and non-Slavic nationalities was in a state of rapid flux, with
birthrates and increased population growth shifting markedly in favor
of the non-Slavic elements. / Table 1-5 lists the percentage composition
of Soviet ethnic groups from 1897-1970. 15
TABLE 1-5
PERCENTAGE OF ETHNIC GROUPS COMPARED
WITH TOTAL POPULATION
Ethnic Groups 1897 1926 1959 1970
Russians 44. 4 47. 5 54. 6 53. 4
Ukrainians 19. 4 21. 4 17. 8 16. 9
Belorussians 4. 5 3.6 3.8 3. 7
Tatars 1.9 1. 7 2. 4 2. 5
Turko -Moslems 12. 1 10. 1 10. 3 12. 9
Jews 3. 5 2. 4 1. 1 0.9
Europeans 3.9 3.6 3.8 3.8
Lithuanians 1. 3 I. 2 1. 1 1. 1
Finnish 2. 3 2. 2 1. 5 1. 4
Moldavians 1. 1. 2 I. 1 1. 2
The western portion of the U.S.S.R. appears as a highly homo-
geneous, but demographically declining region. Characteristics of the
nationalities inhabiting European-Russia are: Low and declining birth- —
rates, a high degree of urbanization, and a propensity to migrate to





of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the Caucasus demonstrate a roughly-
similar degree of homogeneity (predominantly Turko-Moslem), but are
best characterized by a resistance to both urbanization and migration.
In addition, the implementation of a federal structure along nationality
lines has resulted in most republics maintaining a predominate portion
of the indigenous nationality. Table 1-6 provides the ethnic breakout
by republic.
The massive disparity between the birthrates of European-Russia
and the indigenous nationalities of Central Asia is best illustrated by
the fact that in 1975 the population of the R. S. F. S. R. grew only 5. 9
per 1000 while that of Uzbekistan increased by 27. 3 per 1000 popu-
17
lation. Similar disparities are noted throughout Central Asia and to
1
8
some degree in the Caucasus as illustrated in Table 1-7. Thus, the
national increase for the regions of Central Asia, despite gradual re-
ductions in crude birthrates, will continue at the rate of two-and-one-half
times the national rate for Kazakhstan and the Caucasus while the figure
jumps to 5 times the national average for the Core Central Asian re-
publics. "
Modified and converted from: Murray Feshbach, "Prospects for
Outmigration From Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Next Decade, "
in The Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, U.S.C. Joint Economic
Committee, 1979, p. 696. J842-24
17
M. Rywkin, Central Asia and Soviet Manpower, " Problems of
Communism, Jan. -Feb. 1979, p. 3.
18
Modified from: Murray Feshbach, "Prospects For Outmigra-
tion
. . . ,
" p.674.
19
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These regional differentials will linger throughout the remainder
of the century and will significantly affect the balance of minorities
in the labor force and the military.
Information published in the preliminary census for 1979 shows
that the impact of nationality on birthrate considerably outweighs that
of territory, and that the effect of the Russian and Slavic populations
in Central Asia has been a minor diminution of the birthrate (see Table
20
1-8). Also, research conducted by Helen Carrere d'Encausse shows
that urbanization, education, and higher income, have had little impact
2 I
upon the Central Asian birthrates. For example, a rise in urban-
ization in Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaidzhan has done little to
offset high birthrates. Lithuania, by comparison, has a similar urban-
ization rate with a corresponding decrease in the birthrate. Turkmenia,
demonstrates a much higher rate of urbanization than the other Moslem
22
republics, and yet, it's population shows the same high level of births.
Belorussia is much less urbanized, yet the birthrate is markedly low.
Table 1-9 shows 'that family size and the average number of births per
2 3woman are only marginally affected by changes in income. The cumu-
lative impact of the above is that the traditional variables of urbanization,
income, and education which generally affect Western birthrates will
have very little effect in diminishing Central Asian birthrates.
? Darsky, op. cit.
, p. 1.










BIRTHRATES IN THE UNION REPUBLICS: AVERAGE NUMBER
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2.22 3.88
2. 51 3. 88
2.89 4. 12
3. 04 4. 17
3.23 4.22












This leads one to the conclusion that Central Asian birthrates are a
product of cultural factors peculiar to the Turko-Moslems which
stress the dominant role of the male and a smaller representation of
the female population in the work force.
The consequence of the present birthrate trend is that by the 1980's,
the rapidly growing population of Central Asia will provide the major
increments to the working age population and will most likely serve
to offset net declines (retirements and deaths minus increments) in
24
the Western portions of the U.S.S.R. Recent Soviet sources, as
reported by Michael Rywkin, estimate that Soviet Central Asia now
accounts for 30% of all Soviet population growth and that by the year
25
2000 Central Asia will account for 50% of the total population growth.
For a number of subjective and scientific reasons, it also appears that
little or nothing can be done to affect these trends in the short or long
term. Firstly, the cultural variables impacting upon Central Asian
birthrates have shown a high degree of resilience in the face of Soviet
efforts to discredit traditional values and practices as "remnants of
feudalism. " Secondly, nearly 50% of the Central Asian population is
in the lowest age brackets indicating that birth control measures can-
not significantly reverse the Moslem population explosion before the
26










Central Asian with the proportions in the younger age brackets being
27
substantially higher." Table 1-10 provides estimated and projected
28
populations by republic for the period 1950-2000. Table I -11, from
the 1979 census preliminary report, lists population growth by republic
for the period 1970-1979. 29
Historical differences in the pattern of inter-regional migration
and urban-rural migration will also impact heavily upon the demo-
graphic structure in the years ahead. It has already been shown
(Table 1-6) that the Russian and, to a much lesser extent, other Slavic
nationalities have exhibited a strong tendency toward inter-regional
migration, as demonstrated by the fact that in none of the Central Asian
republics is the percentage representation of Russians less than 10%.
Table 1-10 demonstrates that by 1990, the rapid growth of the Central
Asian population will drive the Russian representation in the total
U.S.S.R. population below 50%. If the Russian pattern of migration
continues as in the past, it will result in a "spreading" of the Russian
nationalities throughout the U.S.S.R. with the Russian representation
declining relative to the indigenous nationalities. The Central Asians,
on the other hand, have been very resistant to inter-regional migration
resulting in a situation whereby the increasing Moslem populations will
remain concentrated in the republics of Soviet Central Asia. This
27
A. J. DiMaio, "The Soviet Union and Population, " in Compara-




29Central Statistical Administration, "Preliminary Results of the
1979 Census, " Pravda, April 22, p. 4. , in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, Vol. 31, No. 16, p. 1.
29
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720 262, 442 109
Russian Republic 130 ,079 137, 552 106
Ukraine Republic 47, 1 26 49, 757 106
Belorussian Republic 9, 002 9, 559 106
Uzbek Republic 11, 799 15, 391 130
Kazakh Republic 13, 009 14, 685 113
Georgian Republic 4, 686 5, 016 107
Azerbaidzhan Republic 5, 117 6, 028 107
Lithuanian Republic 3, 128 3, 399 118
Moldavian Republic 3, 569 3, 948 109
Latvian Republic 2, 364 2, 521 111
Kirgiz Republic 2, 934 3, 529 120
Tadzhik Republic 2, 900 3, 801 131
Armenian Republic 2, 492 3, 031 122
Turkmenian Republic 2, 159 2, 759 128
Estonian Republic 1, 356 1, 466 108
The population growth in most of the Union republics was




resistance to migration has been attributed to traditional attachments
to the native village, a weak knowledge of the Russian language,
peculiarities of the local cultural and religious traditions, and in-
sufficient industrial skill levels to compete with Europeans. Thus,
by the mid-1970's only 3% of the Kazakhs and less than 1% of the other
Central Asian nationalities lived in portions of the R. S. F. S. R. with
31
the exception of fringe or border regions. Similarly, rural to urban
migration has proceeded at a gradual pace relative to the European
republics of the U. S.S.R. This resistance to urban migration occurred
at a time of significant industrial investment in Central Asia and has
resulted in industrial labor shortages in Central Asian cities despite
an abundance of manpower resources. Table 1-12 shows the progress
32
of rural to urban migration by republic from 1959-1970.
TABLE 1-12


















The cumulative impact of current birthrate trends and migratory
patterns will be to reverse the earlier trends toward Russian demo-
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nationalities in the outlying republics. This trend will be replaced by-
one in which the % representation of Russian, Slavic, and European
nationalities will decline, not only in the outlying republics, but in
33
their own republics as well. Table 1-13 demonstrates this trend.
Thus, the industrial Western regions of the U.S.S.R. can expect to
suffer substantial manpower shortages for the maintenance of economic
growth, while a vast pool of poorly utilized, underemployed minority
nationalities will grow and remain concentrated in the "Southern Tier. "
However, the implications of what appear to be distinctly unfavor- -
—
able demographic trends do not necessarily raise crucial issues for
the central leadership if the minority nationalities can be effectively
assimilated into a "Soviet" society. Success in the area of assimilation
and "Russification" could result in a Central Asian population with
educational, technical, ideological, and linguistic capabilities enabling
them to contribute to the future economic and social development of
the U.S.S.R. The section which follows will discuss nationality policies
and issues in the U.S.S.R. and will evaluate the success of Central
Asian (and other minority) assimilation. For it is the degree to which
the "Southern Tier" can be assimilated into the Soviet culture that will





B. NATIONALISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION
"As a preschooler he was an Octobrist; then he proudly wore
the red neckerchief of the Pioneers and learned the rudiments
of socialist morality and behavior. . . . And now, having come
of age, this citizen, inwhom the regime has invested so much,
spontaneously rediscovers, the authority of the Father and the
Elders, the disparaged traditions, the pre-eminent solidarity of
the national cultural group from which he sprang. (d'Encausse,
Decline of an Empire )
This passage provides a clear explanation of what many scholars .
,
refer to as the distinct failure of the Soviet policy of minority assimi-
i
lation. Inheriting a multi-ethnic empire from his Czarist predecessors,
it became Lenin's task and that of his successors to somehow assimilate
or control the indigenous nationalities of the borderlands. The vulner-
ability of the Czarist regime in World War I was greatly multiplied by
its vulnerability in the borderlands. It would appear that in the 60 years
which have followed the Soviet Union has done much to transform society,




It can be said that the nationality policy invisioned by Lenin can be "
—
divided into a two phase process. In the first phase, the complete
autonomy and integrity of the individual nations would be allowed to
flourish, enabling the borderlands to apply and exhaust their national
aspirations through self determination. This phase would be followed
34




by a second in which national differences would disappear with all
nationalities blending into a new, "Soviet" people. Rashidov,
the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee,
describes the process in these words:
"The Program contained the first scientific formulation of the
principles of a ruling Communist Party's nationalities policy.
These principles included: self determination and the complete
equality of nation; the voluntary political, military, and economic
alliance of peoples who have embarked on a socialist path of devel-
opment; the guaranteeing of their actual equality in all fields of life
on the basis of fraternal mutual assistance and all-round cooperation;
the combination of international and All-Union interests with national
interests; and the flourishing and drawing together of socialist nations. "3°
Thus, a federal system was established within which the individual
nations were urged to develop and assert their political and cultural
demands, and over the years, conditions were established (urbanization,
education, industrialization) in which integration should have taken place.
However, rather than exhibiting a collective choice to merge with the
socialist center, the behavior of the Central Asian peoples reflects a
desire to maintain and protect a distinctly national identity. It may be
that the very federal system designed to promote the initiation of the
second phase has resulted in concentrated, homogeneous national bodies
which have maintained their cultural heritage and have utilized the Leninist
system as a focus for the articulation of their rightful demands. Their






Rashidov, "On a Path of Unity and Fraternity, " Pravda, May 23,




The failure of the Central Asian nationalities to be assimilated into
the Soviet system is best exemplified by their refusal to migrate to
non-Moslem regions, continued high birthrates, extremely low levels
of-inter-racial marriages, limited progress toward the adoption of
the Russian language, and the continued adherence to traditional
religious and cultural practices forbidden by the State. Each of these
elements will be discussed individually at a later point.
The system which the Russians established to control the border-
lands involved the extensive use of local Russians to occupy the most
important State and Party positions. The Russians were deployed in
such a way as to correllate their strength to the political importance
of a particular agency or post. Those postions not occupied by
Russians (the majority) were available to local nationalities, fostering
the creation of a local elite with some significant access to the decision
making process. This practice tended to give a surface legitimacy to
the political system. At the top of the party structure, a two man system
was employed whereby a local communist serving as First Secretary
shared power with a Russian Second Secretary. The First Secretary
practice offered "visible proof" to the local nationals that "one of their
own people could attain honor, power, and prestige within the Soviet
37
system. " The Second Secretary was generally "alien to the country
and to its people, history, needs, and aspirations, " ^8 serving as the
eyes and ears of the Central Committee of the C. P.S. U.
37
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central
Asia
,





"The impact of Soviet rule in Tadzhikistan has had far reaching
and irreversible consequences. There
,
as in other republics
of Soviet Central Asia, modernization has been synonymous with
sovietization, which, in turn, has been synonymous with Russian
rule." 39
It has been reported that the Russian minorities in Central Asia
receive higher salaries, more housing space, better access to higher
education for their children, more skills, and better positions than
the natives. However, with increased development, changing popu-
lation balances, and the expansion of the local elites within the
bureaucracy, the gap between the "European settlers" and the Moslems
has been narrowing in various areas including health, education, skill
levels, housing, living standards, and jobs.
Lanugage has been one of the keystones of the Russian assimilation
program, for it is the Russian language which
".
. .
plays an important role in the progressive process of the
steady drawing together of all Soviet peoples and the strengthening
of their fraternal friendship and unity.
There are currently more than 100 languages in use in the U.S.S.R.
Jonathan Pool predicts that Russian will remain the national "link
language" for those who need it, but that it will not become the only
language of the Union. He feels that the fourteen national languages
(protected by the constitution) will thrive while the numerous minor











Jonathon Pool, "Soviet Language Planning: Goals, Results,
Options," in Jeremy Azrael, Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices ,
(New York: Praeger, 1978) p. 223.
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of the Russian language among the Asian nationalities is amply demon-
strated in Soviet as well as foreign sources. Seton-Watson reports
that the Tatars and Armenians, many of whom live outside their
native republics, overwhelmingly retain their own language. In the
Moslem nations of Central Asia, the degree of language assimilation
is even lower; in no case does the percentage of Moslems who admit
to speaking Russian as a second language exceed 20%. ^ The prelimi-
nary results of the 1979 census indicate that 93. 1% of the population
consider their native tongue to be their first language. Brian
Silver's research indicates that the acquisition of the Russian language
by minorities is most affected by the frequency of contact with Russians,
but that the frequency of interaction is by no means sufficient condition
since even as contact increases to extremely high levels Moslems and
45
"ruralities" do not readily acquire Russian as the national language.
Thus, the failure to achieve a high level of success in the spreading
of the Russian language throughout the borderlands is indicative of the
degree to which these peoples have been assimilated into a Soviet sys-
tem. The survival of national languages signifies the continued vitality
of the national culture and is a major barrier to intermarriage, migration
and eventual integration. Table 1-14 summarizes the progress of the
46
language program in the various republics from 1926-1970. More
importantly, it appears that the failure of indigenous nationalities to
43
Hugh Seton-Watson, "The Last of the Empires," in The Washing-
ton Quarterly
,





Brian Silver, Language Policy and the Linguistic Russification
of Soviet Nationalities, " in Azrael, op. cit.
, p. 301.
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d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 168.

TABLE 1-14
PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS OF NATIONAL GROUPS WHO CONSIDER
THEIR LANGUAGE AS THEIR MOTHER TONGUE

















99. 7% 99.8% 99. 8%
87. 1 87. 7 85. 7
71. 8 84. 2 80. 6
97.8 97.9
95. 1 95. 2
95. 2 95. 5
96. 5 98.6 98. 4
92. 4 89.9 91. 4
93.8 97. 6 98. 2
99.6 98. 4 98
99. 1 98. 4 98. 6
97. 6 98.9 98.9
98.3 98. 1 98. 5




acquire the Russian languages is the result of processes occurring in
both urban and rural environments: in rural areas villagers cling to
their traditional language because of a strong identity with the local
community, while in the cities nationalistic sentiment on the part of
local elites motivates them to protect the national language.
"The unique role of Russian as the language of inter-group contact
and individual mobility may some day be seen as an unfair and
un-Leninist priviledge granted to one nationality
. . .
Soviet pub-
lications already recognize that monolingualism among Russians
obstructs the development of favorable attitudes and relations
4-7between Russians and others. "
Perhaps no single force poses greater difficulties for future inte-
gration of the Turko-Moslem nationalities of Central Asia and the
Caucasus than the resilience and resurgence of Islam. For it is Islam,
to a large degree, which provides traditional values unfavorable to
"Sovietization" and it is the only integrative force linking numerous
Turko-Moslem nationalities in the various republics. Bennigsen
describes Islam in the Soviet Union as having two faces: the official
Islam with 300 Mosques and Z000 registered clerics which is "essentially
unimportant survival of another age now rapidly disappearing in the
conditions of socialist society; "and the underground Islam of the brother-
hoods and adepts which we know of because of the persistence with which
AQ
they are attacked in the Soviet press.
"This selectivity suggests that the popular cultural, and unofficial
aspects of Islam are increasingly powerful and dangerous to the
regime, and that the Soviet leadership is not attacking official Islam
lest it drive even more Muslims from under its direct supervision
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Soviet sources also express the concern that there has been an in-
creasing "confusion" in the popular mind between Islam and
nationalistic ideas, and that this confusion "Has complicated the
50problem of fighting survivals of the past. " The same Sufi brother-
hoods which led the Daghestani-Chechen revolt of 1920 and the Central
Asian Basmachi movement lasting from 1918-1936 have reappeared
and their influence among Moslems is growing strong, particularly in
CI
the North Caucasus.
"Soviet writers now rank the Sufi brotherhoods among the most
intractible and dangerous adversaries of the Soviet regime because
the Tariqas are the only authentic anti -Soviet mass organization
in the U.S.S.R. " 52
Bennigsen further cites three important innovations in the under-
ground Islam: improved secrecy and less vulnerability; effectiveness
in mobilizing women; and a younger membership with increasing rep-
resentation by the intelligentsia. The Tariqas are now one of the main
reasons why Islamic beliefs, traditions, and customs continue in the
53U.S.S.R. These traditions include a subordinate role for women,
the "sale" of brides, appeal to Islamic courts, and veneration of and
pilgrimmages to "holy places. " Soviet sources increasingly complain















Force believers not to participate in elections to organs of
Soviet power, not to receive or to destroy official documents in-
cluding passports, and to refuse service in the ranks of the Soviet
Army ... A decisive struggle has and will continue to be conducted
against such violations on the part of fanatical mullahs who created
illegal religious societies, and restore the so called "holy places.'
Particularly disturbing to the author of the above, a member of the
Council on Religious affairs, was the proliferation of holy places which
are the object of pilgrimmages including the grave of one person con-
demned by a Soviet court.
Critchlow sees Islam as one factor in a "burgeoning ethnicity that is
55increasingly adopting nationalistic forms. " Critchlow also asserts
that the demographic boom and the rise of economic growth and social
progress has enhanced the Moslem influence in national and inter-
national politics.
"Social cleavages are further deepened by a strong aversion to
intermarriage between Muslims and Europeans, which persists
despite the urgings of official propogandists to cross ethnic barriers
to matrimony. This aloofness is traceable in part to the taboo on
marriage between Muslim females and non-Muslim males imposed
by Islamic law . . . Islam and ethnicity are so closely intertwined
that the distinction is often blurred. "
Critchlow further asserts that Soviet insitutions feed national
awareness, internalizing nationalism among the socialized urban elites
on whom Moscow depends to fill the political infrastructure.
54
V. Kuroyedov, "Activities of Soviet Christians and Moslems, "
Kommunist
,
No. 5, 1980 in Soviet World Outlook, 15 May 1980.
55
Critchlow, "Minarets and Marx, " in The Washington Quarterly ,








He sees Islamic nationalism as the source of a quiet resistance to
"Sovietization" and demographic strength and economic importance
as providing "leverage" in making justifiable demands upon the center.
A recent example of this quiet resistance and the persistence of
traditional values on the part of local communist elites in Moslem
areas is provided in the 1979 ouster of two prominent Communist
Party of Azerbaidzhan members which received extensive coverage
in the Soviet press. The local Minister of Trade and the Minister
of Public Health were both ousted for "serious shortcomings in their
work, perversion of party principles in the selection and placement
of personnel, abuse of official positions, protection of unscrupulous
individuals, and behavior unworthy of a Communist. " ° Their crimes
included "favoritism, " "nepotism, " abetting illegal actions by relatives
and pulling wires for them, refusal to increase the number of female
employees, introducing progressive methods too slowly, and failure
to take decisive steps against "negative phenomena. " ' Although
nepotism and resistance to official policy may be found throughout the
Soviet Union, official concern is much greater when the exhibition of
these traits appears to be the result of adherance to traditional Islamic
values. This example highlights the extreme difficulty which Moscow
faces in opposing the very cadres which they have trained and placed
in political positions.
58
From a series of articles in Bakinsky rabochy , June-July 1979





"Each nationality wants to ensure its continuance, not the destruction
of the existing system, but the broadening within the system of their
national priveledges and the advantages that may be derived from them.
The goal of every nation is the strict application of federalism, real
autonomy of power within each republic, and equal participation for
all the republics in decision making at the federal level. "°0
"This modern aspect of nationalism and its defense by the most
advanced segment of the Soviet population is what Moscow finds
most disconcerting, and prompts Soviet leaders to re-examine an
issue they thought should have been settled long ago. "61
This passive resistence to centralist tendencies is not limited to the
Asian nationalities. Even in the Slavic Ukraine resistance to Russifi-
I
cation and the persistence of nationalistic sentiments continue. Bilinsky
argues that this resistance has taken essentially three forms. The first
has been an increasing tendency to fill C. P. U. membership slots with
local Ukrainians rather than Russians. This has been a long term trend.
Also, Shelest resisted the Russification of elementary and secondary
schools and, although he was not completely successful, in 1974 the
percentage of schools using the Ukrainian language was 60%. Under
Shelest, local elites were permitted to argue against the development
of Siberia at the expense of increased capital investment in Ukrainian
fuel industries.
"It was under Shelest that some Soviet Ukrainian administrators
privately insisted.
. .
that the Ukraine was being economically
exploited: if they had not had to contribute so much to the Union
budget, the Ukraine would have. . . solved the housing shortage







Yaroslay Belinsky, "Mykala Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: An
essay on the Persistence and Limits of Ukrainian National Communism, "







The same author concludes that:
".
. .
with Russian and Ukrainian nationalism increasingly moving
onto a collision course and the central government increasingly-
siding with the former, the end result could be a tragedy for Russia
as well as the Ukraine. "°4
As the Russian population falls below 50% and the demands of the
periphery for more power and resources rise, one may expect Russian
nationalism to rise as well. Enders Wimbush argues that economic
development of the borderlands is quite often perceived by Russians as
sacrifice for the benefit of others. He feels that the economic and
societal difficulties of the coming decades may necessitate the mobili-
zation of the Russians.
"In such a situation it is by no means certain that the regime,
having turned to Russian nationalism for help, will be able to turn
against it or even bring it under control.
It is also apparent that to many Russians, the term "Sovietization"
LL
has become synonymous with Russification. It has been observed
that more violent forms of protest by Russians living in the borderlands




, p. I 32.
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Defensive nationalism is marked by a return to Slavophile
ideals and orthodoxy. Frightened by the rise of Eastern national-
ities and by an ideology that robs Russia herself of her cultural
heritage, the more intellectual elements are turning back to more
traditional values. °8
Thus, in a period of increasing demands from the periphery and
with limited investment resources available, Russian nationalism,
even in its mildest forms, will impose considerable constraints upon
the leadership in granting concessionary demands to the growing
minorities. It is clear that increasing demographic strength in the
Southern tier combined with increasing nationalism and a divergence
of cultures will hamper any near-term solution to the national question.
Investment decisions and political policies will certainly take on added






III. THE LABOR SUPPLY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. OVERVIEW
In the 1980's and 1990's, demographic distortions will combine
with emerging economic problems to effectively reduce the potential
for continued rapid economic growth. The economic difficulties with
which the leadership will be faced in the very near future are enormous
and will require the exercise of a certain management efficiency and
flexibility which has been all too often lacking in the historical experience
of the U.S.S.R. The major realities confronting the Soviet Union in the
decade ahead are diminishing productivity, smaller growth in the capital
stock, declining oil production, continued agricultural difficulties,
unfavorable hard currency balances, and a severe labor shortage
accompanied by large regional disparities in the distribution of labor.
The combined effect of these difficulties will be substantial in the absence
of decisive action by the leadership within the period of the next Five Year
Plan (1981-1985).
This chapter will discuss briefly the major economic problems con-
fronting the Soviet leadership, with the major emphasis placed upon
manpower issues and policy alternatives. The primary purpose will be
to determine the likely direction of Soviet economic policy in matters
relating to manpower and the labor force, including an analysis of the
potential for success. The remaining task will then be to judge the
implications of these policies for the Soviet Armed Forces.
In contrast to most developed nations, the Soviet Union has main-
tained growth in the national income through enormous injections of
48

labor, capital, and raw materials; rather than improving intensive
factor productivity. In part, this is the result of the leadership's
committment to rapid industrialization, and has been historically-
possible because of massive reserves of material and human resources.
In the 1980's as labor and energy resources become increasingly scarce,
the issue of factor productivity can be expected to take on an entirely new
role in the process of economic planning. In fact, there are already
indications that it will become the predominant variable. In the early
and mid-1970's, the industrial sector maintained growth despite a
slower growth in the supply of labor. But in the late 1970's, and on
into the 1980's, as labor and energy shortages worsen, it is doubtful
that the gains in productivity made thus far will be capable of making
up the difference.
The economic strategy formulated for the 10th Five Year Plan
(1976-1980) concentrates upon "efficiency and quality" as opposed to
the traditional emphasis upon quantitative gains. Utilization of the
so-called Shchekino Plan, which provides incentives for enterprise
managers to achieve the same production levels with less labor, is
encouraged along with a reduction in the vast number of Soviet workers
still utilizing manual labor. To date, the effort has been half-hearted
with few real adjustments in mangement incentives of the magnitude
required. The primary emphasis has remained upon meeting production
quotas. It is more likely that the next Five Year Plan (1981-1985) will
undertake productivity gains in earnest.
49

In conjunction with the emphasis upon increased productivity, the
economic plans presented to the 25th Party Congress call for a de-
regionalization of investment decisions. This appears to be an attempt
to lessen the political repurcussions of future investment policies which
may be unpopular in the growing Southern Tier. Closely related to this
was the apparent shift from ideology to "scientific management" in the
allocation and utilization of economic resources. The combined in-
tention of the two modifications may be to increase the degree of
flexibility and responsiveness within the economic structure. In
practical terms, these proposals do not indicate a preferential switch
toward a market mechanism, rather they allow the leadership greater
flexibility in choosing beneficial options concerning peripheral issues
such as increased bonuses for laborers and larger pension-plus-earnings
ceilings for retirees.
The final reorientation evident in recent years is a lessening of the
emphasis upon new construction in favor of reconstruction and repair
of existing plant and equipment. This includes increased emphasis upon
the rapid and efficient conclusion of construction projects already under-
way. This guidance may soon become crucial in the determination of the
distribution of scarce investment funds under the next Five Year Plan.
Brezhnev personally associated himself with this particular orientation
at the 25th Party Congress as follows:
1
George Breslaur, "Domestic Issues, " in Dallin, Twenty Fifth Party
Congress of the C. P. S. U.
,
(Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1977),
P. 7.
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Author cites this as an attempt to play down the ideological and con-
flict-provoking aspects of policy formation. A basic reorientation. Gail







capital investments must not be allocated to ministries and
agencies in general, nor to new projects, but rather for a planned
increase in output. Material and financial resources must be
directed into the technical retooling and reconstruction of existing
enterprise s--into the expansion of production capacities without
new construction or with minimum per unit capital investments.
Breslaur reports that Brezhnev was also very forceful in calling for:
an end to resistance against basic administrative reforms; efficiency,
quality, and modernization rather than increasing consumption or im-
proving the standard of living; de-regionalization of investment decisions;
development of Siberian resources; expensive irrigation systems for
Central Asia; and ideological change in regional investment policy.
Breslaur also notes the adoption of expensive measures for river projects
demanded by the First Secretaries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenia; and characterizes as "overt interest articulation" the
activities of Central Asian delegates pressing for greater diversification
c
of their local economies. J The ability to make such demands and to have
them adopted (especially in light of the dictum against "new construction")
is not surprising in relation to the previously mentioned demographic
explosion in the South.
Thus, the general guidelines which are now operative, and which
should serve as the basis of the next Five Year Plan, seem to be an
emphasis on modernization and increased productivity; less ideology
and more "science"; a low level of new construction where avoidable;
little or no growth in consumption; and functional (.rather than regional)
3
in V. P. Krasovskii, "Investment Policy and Reconstruction,
Ekonomika i organizatisiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, No. 4, 1979,
pp. 76-91. in The Soviet Review, Spring 1980, p. 84.
4
Breslaur, op. cit.
5 ibid., pp.21 and 22.
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B. INVESTMENT, CONSUMPTION, DEFENSE, AND TRADE
Capital investment plays a very important role in the Soviet
Economy. The centrally planned economy which emphasizes massive
military expenditures and high levels of investment is virtually the
only economy in the world in which the quantity of capital has grown
more rapidly than the G. N. P. itself. Until recently, the clear long
term economic strategy of the Soviet leaders has been to increase the
rate of growth in annual investment. The leadership was quite success-
ful with this strategy in the post-war period, but the rate of growth in
investment expenditures has recently been quite difficult to maintain and
the rate of growth of capital stock has fallen off. The Soviets' own plans
for the years through 1980 show a reduction in the growth of investment
each year. As mentioned earlier, this will most likely be achieved by
holding down the quantity of new construction. In the late 70's and early
1980's investment growth will drop from the 7% average of 1971-1975
m ft
to only 3.2% per year. Also, the construction sector has been ordered
to prioritize projects already underway, thereby reducing the growth in
the backlog on unfinished construction. This may assist in achieving
6
J. Berliner, "Economic Prospects, " in Robert Wesson; ed. The
Soviet Union: Looking to the 1980's
,
(Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1979), p. 94.
7
Admiral Turner, "Soviet Economic Developments, " in the Soviet
Union and China-Part 5
, 1979 p. 10.
8
Holland Hunter, The Future of the Soviet Economy: 1978-1985
,
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 17.
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one-time gains in productivity, but the construction starts foregone
during the next several years may lead to a slowdown in capital
o
formation in the late 1980's. Abram Bergson argues that an invest-
ment economy similar to the traditional Soviet system actually requires
an increasing share of output for investment to maintain economic
growth. He contends that, to a large extent, the recent decline in the
growth of G. N. P. is directly attributable to the deceleration of capital
stock growth. Another investment decision designed to increase
productivity will be the increased mechanization and automation of labor
intensive auxiliary processes including loading, warehousing, and
materials handling which currently absorb more than 33% of the U.S.S.R. 's
total industrial employment.
Soviet G. N. P. growth has declined steadily during the 1970's from an
average 4.2% during the period 1971-1974 to a forecasted average of
12
about 2% in the period 1979-1982. Recent data shows that actual per-
formance in 1979 may have been even worse. With a declining level of
national income growth even moderate growth in investment will require
reductions elsewhere, presumably in consumption or government defense
spending. The decisions taken in preparation for the 25th Party Congress
seem to indicate that reductions will most likely come in the production
of consumer goods, rather than reducing the growth of military expendi-













expenditures while the military represents about 13%, consumption
becomes the likely candidate to support investment growth. In fact,
the rate of growth in per capita consumption has fallen substantially
13
in the 1970's. Recent labor unrest in the Soviet Union and massive
strikes in Poland may serve to indicate the dangers of abandoning
consumer gains and may force a policy reorientation in the next Five
Year Plan.
Thus, military spending is likely to continue its growth of about
4% per year in the near future. Reduction in the level of military
spending would require a basic re-evaluation of the Soviet Union's
recent defense posture in light of increased N.A.T.O. expenditures,
U.S. strategic upgrading, continued concern about the China threat,
and a period of possible political succession. With decreasing energy
resources predicted for the 1980's and a re-emphasis away from new
construction, the military may have to forego some of their newest
programs, but modernization as a whole will continue. In the short
term it is not clear that reduced military spending would actually
help the economy. Diverting heavy industrial resources and retooling
for consumer production would take years. Those military technologies
which are most useful in the civilian sector (electronics, computer,
etc. ) are precisely the technologies which the military cannot do with-
out.
The above discussion has provided the general political guidelines









the conclusion that Soviet efforts for maintaining economic growth
will most likely be concentrated in the area of capital investment.
Specifically, investment funds will be allocated to reconstruction and
repair as well as to the modernization and automation of auxiliary
processes which tie up excessive labor and lower productivity. Since
Soviet industry has demonstrated a remarkably poor ability to design,
produce, and apply auxiliary equipment to specific industrial uses, it
seems apparent that the Soviets will seek increased foreign trade.
Other motivations for increased trade are the need for high technology
drilling equipment and pipeline to tap less accessible oil reserves,
and high technology machinery for retooling and modernization of
existing plants (also grain).
Brainard argues that the ability of the Soviet Union to obtain credit
for foreign technology buys is not as limited as might be expected by
their hard currency balances. The fact that the preponderant share
of Soviet credit is provided by the official finance institutions of foreign
governments, and the prevalent use of the compensation agreement in
Soviet credit transactions tend to increase credit availability. Loans
obtained from foreign governments can very often be obtained in
larger mounts and with longer payback periods. Under compensation
agreements, the Soviets obtain credit to purchase Western technology
and simultaneously enter into contracts for the sale of the resultant
product. The long term output of such projects is used for domestic
15
Lawrence Brainard, "Foreign Economic Constraints on Soviet
Economic Policy in the 1980's" in U.S.C. Joint Economic Committee,
The Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, 1979, p. 98.
55

consumption, fulfillment of the pay back contract, and the earning of
hard currency balances. Export earnings from compensation deals
already negotiated are projected at $4 billion by 1985. *° Thus, al-
though the ratio of Soviet debt service to exports is currently estimated
at . 23 (. 25 is generally considered quite poor) the availability of credit
should continue as long as the enterprises contemplated under potential
compensation agreements are economically viable. This, again, high-
lights the importance of productivity and efficiency. Future constraints
upon the availability to obtain credit will be predominantly domestic,
not foreign.
With foreign credit and technology, the Soviet Union's comparative
advantage in the production and export of raw materials will persist
almost indefinitely, and will be of great assistance in industrial
1 7
modernization. Although foreign trade will become increasingly
important for the Soviets in the 1980's, it is unlikely that there will be
1 8











C. MANPOWER AVAILABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION
1979 appears to have been a year of particularly poor economic
performance in the Soviet Union. Growth in G.N. P. was less than
1%, predicted energy difficulties developed, agricultural production
was poor, and several key industrial sectors experienced an absolute
decline in output as a result of manpower shortages. ' These man-
power shortages occurred at a time of relative manpower abundance
when compared to the sharply reduced supply expected through the
remaining decades of the century. Labor force additions for 1979 were
estimated at 2. 3 million, but by 1985 the number of additions will fall
20
off to 300,000. Thus, current economic growth is quite poor and is
likely to worsen as energy and human resources become less abundant.
The demographic trends discussed in Chapter I will cause a continuation
of manpower shortages for the rest of the century.
Labor shortages take on a very important role in the Soviet economy
because of a demonstrated inability to improve productivity and because
increased labor utilization has been traditionally relied upon to improve
economic growth. Efforts toward more efficient utilization of labor
failed throughout the 1970's, despite substantial access to Western
technology. Productivity growth fell from 0.8% per year in the 1960's
19
Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Economic Performance in
1979 and Prospects for 1980," 1980.




to 0% in the period 1971-1974 and the -0. 4% in the latter 1970's. 21
Indicators for 1979 also show that more recent efforts to increase
productivity have failed to achieve substantial gains. 2 With these
considerations in mind, maintenance of an adequate labor force
becomes absolutely crucial to the future of the Soviet economy.
In the 1980's the increments to the able-bodied age cohorts will
be about 1/5 the level of increments in the early 1970's. This level
will begin to recover in the 1990' s, but will still be less than 3/4 of
the 1970 figure in the year 2000. 23 This rapid decline is largely the
result of two independent processes; a decline in the number of labor
force entrants, and a rise in the number of departures as a result of
death or retirement. The demographic aging of the population dis-
cussed previously has resulted in a situation in which the number of
departures due to death or retirement nearly equals the number of
entrants. Table 2-1 provides the data for labor force additions from
1975 to 1990. 24
In addition to the economic impact described above, the scarcity of
manpower resources may have adverse affects on the size of the Armed
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POPULATION OF WORKING AGE
(Millions, Midyear)
Annual
Total Increments Entrants Deaths Departures
1975 144. 4 2. 7 5. 1 0. 5 1.9
1976 147. 1 2. 7 5.2 0.6 1.9
1977 149. 7 2.6 5.2 0.6 2.
1978 152. 2. 3 5.0 0.6 2. 1
1979 153.9 1.9 4.8 0. 7 2. 2
1980 155. 5 1.6 4.6 0.6 2. 4
1981 156.6 1. 1 4. 3 0. 7 2. 5
1982 157. 3 0. 7 4.2 0.8 2. 7
1983 157.8 0. 5 4. 1 0. 7 2.9
1984 158.2 0. 4 4. 0. 7 2.9
1985 158.6 0. 4 4.0 0. 7 2.9
1986 158.9 0.3 4. 0. 7 3.
1987 159.3 0. 4 4. 1 0. 7 3.
1988 159.9 0.6 4.2 0. 7 2.9
1989 160. 5 0.6 4.2 0. 7 2.9
1990 161. 1 0.6 4.3 0. 7 3.0
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and paramilitary units, and with a force that is predominantly staffed
with two year draftees (75%), the Soviets require an estimated 1.68
million 18-year-old males each year to maintain its armed forces. ^
An impressive model formulated by Murray Feshbach and Steven
Rapaway (1976) predicts that available manpower resources will be
sufficient to support a military force of this size only until 1983, at
which time, the number of conscripts needed will exceed the number
of 18-year-old males available for service. Their results are listed
26in Table 2-2. However, even in the late 1980's when the shortages
are at their peak, the difference between the number of 18-year-old
males needed and those available in no case exceeds 200, 000. (see
Table 2-2) It will be argued in later sections that the Soviet leader-
ship has already taken steps to reduce substantially the percentage of
young people attending college and specialized secondary schools, as
well as to keep large numbers of individuals approaching retirement
age on the job. The timing of these actions along with a concerted
effort to systematically place 16-year-old vocational-technical school
graduates directly into industrial enterprises would seem to demon-
strate a definite aversion to military force reduction. In the national
press debate on manpower issues by prominent Soviet spokesmen
such as Kostin, Bestuzhev-Lada and Urlanis, reduction in either the
25
Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit. , p. 147.
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HYPOTHETICAL MODEL OF THE POTENTIAL SUPPLY
OF 18-YEAR-OLD MALES FOR THE MILITARY








exemptions of age Net
Males, and available number
18 years, Minus, deferments for the of males as
of age educational Minus, for non- draft and percent of
as of deferment, male educational for the male
July 1 full-time deaths reasons economy cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2, 558 506 4 256 1, 792 70. 1
2,646 517 3 265 1,861 70. 3
2, 542 528 3 254 1, 757 69. 1
2, 308 530 2 231 1, 545 66.9
2, 105 530 3 211 1, 362 64. 7
2,020 532 2 202 1, 281 63.6
2,034 534 2 203 1,295 63. 7






c:e Conscriptees as Net






available con - number available
:red fo r draft scriptees Co tort available for economy
I (8) (9) (10) (ID (12)
2, 008 1, 688 66. 84. 1 320
2, 086 1, 688 63. 8 80. 9 398
1, 993 1, 688 66. 4 84. 7 305
1, 785 1, 688 73. 1 94. 6 97
1, 592 1, 688 80. 2 106. -96
1, 495 1, 688 83. 6 112. 9 -193
1, 507 1, 688 83. 112. -181
1, 600 1, 688 78. 8 105. 5 -88
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size of the military or the yearly draft intake is not even considered.
This issue will be analyzed in greater detail later in the chapter. It
will be sufficient to say at this point that there will be intense
competition between the military and economic sectors for the shrink-
ing cohort of 18 -year-old males. It is likely that the Soviets will be
able to maintain approximately the same size force as currently exists,
but further expansion would involve the direct diversion of currently
productive industrial manpower into the military sector.
Thus, the quantitative manpower issues facing the Soviet Union are
immense. But the real difficulties lie not so much in the quantitative
availability of manpower as in the regional distribution of human
resources. The projections of both U.S. and Soviet demographers
indicate that the increase in the able-bodied age cohorts in Central
Asia and Kazakhstan will actually exceed that for the U.S.S.R. as a
whole during the 1980's, while the industrially developed R. S. F. S. R.
will suffer a net decrease in labor force additions. The situation will
be essentially the same for the Ukraine and the Baltic Republics. °
Table 2-3 demonstrates the immense disparity between labor force
29
addition trends in the 1970's and those in the 1980's. By the end of
the century, over 1/3 of the available 18-year-olds will come from the
27
The contribution of each of these authors will be specifically
discussed below.
28
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30Southern Tier. The political, economic, and military implications
of manpower distribution are enormous.
The European regions suffering the greatest manpower shortages
are precisely the areas which are most industrialized and which need
massive input into the labor force. On the other hand, Soviet Central
Asia, which is much less industrialized, will have an abundant supply
of labor resources. Solution of the manpower distribution problem
necessitates either a massive influx of industrial investment to utilize
surplus labor in Central Asia, or enormous migration of Central
Asians to the industrial areas of the R. S. F. S. R. As discussed below,
each of these alternatives will be extremely difficult to achieve, and
the Soviets will have to content themselves with a satisfying strategy
that accepts lower levels of economic growth.
Industrial investment on a large scale in Central Asia is essentially
illogical and will not be pursued with a great deal of energy. The
operational constraints are the reduction in the growth of annual invest-
ment, the need to invest heavily in the development of energy industries
in Western Siberia and the Far East, the necessity of avoiding new
construction to concentrate investment capital on the modernization
of the most productive industries, and the poor quality and availability
of urban workers in the South.
The dictum against new construction will be damaging to Central
Asia, as industrial development and diversification of that region
would necessarily require a great deal of new projects. It appears
that those new construction projects which have been approved are
30
Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit.
, p. 1 13,
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"glamour" projects, such as the massive irrigation system mentioned
earlier, which the Central Government can utilize to show their
responsiveness to increasing Central Asian demand for more invest-
ment. Even these projects will be difficult to fund, and it is likely that
dissatisfaction will exist among the local elites for a substantial period
of time. Following the issuance of the Basic Directions for the 10th
Five Year Plan, the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee issued
its own directives ordering the construction of machine-building, light,
food, mixed livestock feed, and small scale local industry in several
31dozen small cities and urban settlements. This move was necessi-
tated by the fact that Central Asians have not only exhibited an aversion
to inter-regional migration, but also migration from rural to urban
areas.
There are numerous indications that rural to urban migration has
decreased in the Central Asian republics, e.g. in Turkmenia, rural
to urban migration constituted 68.6% of urban growth in I960, 52. 7%
32
in 1965, and 27. 0% in 1970. The pattern of rural to urban migration
from 1959-1970 included a drain of young people from the rural pop-
ulation, resulting in a 33% decline in the rural population of individuals
in the 20-24 age cohort. This has left behind a more traditional,
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to urban areas. Thus, a dichotomy has developed wherein there is
an overall abundance of available manpower in Central Asia, but
shortages in urban workers in the industrialized cities. Since the
educational level of Central Asians falls well below that of the Euro-
peans, the availability of highly skilled industrial workers is particularly
acute. Current labor force participation in Uzbekistan is about 45%,
a drastically low figure relative to the R.S.F.R. average of 90%. ^
There are also shortages of skilled agricultural workers capable of
operating mechanized farm equipment. The shortages reported in
Kazakhstan were 38, 000 in 1966 and 85, 000 in 1970. 35 Thus, invest-
ment in Central Asia is limited not only by the availability of investment
resources, but also by the availability of Central Asian skilled wage-
workers. The Soviet authorities seem to have developed a satisfying
strategy of investment for irrigation projects to improve agricultural
efficiency and to expand arable land, as well as the construction of
small scale industries in semi-rural areas designed to involve rural
populations in industrial production.
"Tadzhikistan's rapidly developing industry has a constant man-
power shortage. Yet, the Republic also has unused labor resources.
The prospects for substantial outmigration of Central Asians are






Saidmuradov, "Improve the Mechanism of Economic Management, "
Sotsialisticheskaya industria , 25 Nov. 1978, p. 2, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, 21 Feb. 1978, p. 5.
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Feshbach identifies numerous reasons why migration is not likely
to increase in the near future. Feshbach cites the following explan-
ations for his predictions:
1. Living Standards: Income per family is higher in Central Asia
and the Caucasus than in the U.S.S.R. as a whole. Although
per capita income is lower, the cost of living is low enough to
negate the desireability of higher wages in the R. S. F. S. R.
2. Cultural Factors: There exists a traditional opposition to the
inter-marriage of Moslems with Russians. Also, "The Muslim
peoples of the Central Asian Republics feel that their region is
the cradle of civilization. . . They have a deep attachment to
the ancestral lands and believe that to leave the abode of Islam for
the abode of war is a sin against the community. "38
3. Poor educational preparation for industry: There is a definite
shortage of vocational-technical schools in Central Asia and
enrollment in Central Asian republics averages 7 per 1000 pop-
ulation vs. 15intheR.S.F.S.R.
4. Job Opportunities and Industrial Development: There are numerous
positions available in industrial centers of Central Asia for trained
Moslems. Although investment has slackened, it appears that
there will be ample opportunities for skilled wageworkers to
remain in Central Asia.
5. Poor Knowledge of Russian Language: The inability of most
Central Asians to speak Russian, even as a second language,
limits their usefulness for working in industrial centers of the
R.S. F.S.R.
6. Birthrates: High birthrates and large families prevent movement
in general, but especially to heavily populated industrial areas.
It is clear that the Soviet leadership recognizes the unfavorable
prospects for massive outmigration and has implemented a satisfying
strategy designed to train young people for specific priority projects,
predominantly in Western Siberia. Emphasis will be upon education
in the Russian language beginning in Kindergarten and the use of vocat-
ional-technical school graduates who will work a 2-3 year "tour of











The increasing shortage of and regional inbalance in manpower
resources has forced the Central Government to re-evaluate its
manpower policies and to implement more far-reaching programs
designed to achieve significant gains in relatively short order. The
recent emphasis upon deregionalization of investment decisions and
the downplaying of ideology relative to scientific management has
established an atmosphere in which the government leaders have
given themselves increased latitude for greater flexibility. Soviet
efforts for improved manpower utilization concentrate upon four
particular sectors of the population: auxiliary workers, retirees,
Central Asian vocational-technical school graduates, and Central
Asian women. Each group is discussed below.
E. MODERNIZATION AND AUXILIARY WORKERS
Soviet economists recognize that the maintenance of economic
growth is most likely to be achieved through the implementation of
labor-saving innovations rather than trying to increase inputs of labor
and capital. It appears that this orientation has also been firmly
accepted by the party leadership:
"We must take into account the fact that beginning with the 1980's
we shall have to place still greater emphasis on the intensive
factors of economic growth since other factors are decreasing
sharply. " 39
39Brezhnev, Pravda , 28 Nov. 1978, in Soviet World Outlook , 15
Dec. 1978, p. 4.
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The new economic plans attempt to raise productivity through a
host of measures designed primarily to release the number of auxiliary
workers now employing manual labor into other sectors of industry.
This can only be achieved through the mechanization of auxiliary
processes, a task which has escaped solution in the past. As mentioned
earlier, increased trade with the West will most likely be needed to
make this program a success. Even then, the beneficial impact of
such programs will be minimal.
At present, 1 /Z of all industrial workers in the R. S. F. S. R. fall
into the category of auxiliary workers, only 1/4 of whom work in
mechanized operations. This has historically been, and continues
to be, a very great potential source of manpower reserves, e.g. In
the machine building industry, as much as 54% of the U.S.S.R. 's
workers were involved in auxiliary processes. The comparable figure
41
in the U.S. is less than 30%. And yet, the percentage of auxiliary
workers has been falling at a snail's pace: 55% in 1959, 53% in 1962,
4252% in 1965, and 49% in 1972. As late as 1975, Gosplan indicated
that there was "no overall plan for the mechanization of manual
43
work. " The greatest explanation for the failure of the Soviets to re-
duce the number of manual auxiliary laborers is their inability to develop
specialized production capabilities that would design and produce equipment
40
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No. 12, Dec. 1978, pp. 28-36, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
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and parts for specialized applications. At this point, Western technology
in large amounts will be needed to improve the situation, and even this
will be a long-term proposition. Although Soviet credit may not be
sufficient to purchase raw materials such as crude oil, the use of
the compensation agreement can be utilized to mechanize mineral
and fuel industries and to provide export earnings for the importation
of specialized technology. This area remains as a vast potential source
of manpower reserves. In addition to mechanization, the Soviets will
implement a number of policies to improve the flow of manpower from
schools to industry and to reduce labor turnover. There is also little
likelihood of an extension in the length of the workweek.
F. PENSIONERS
The aging of the Soviet population discussed earlier has resulted
in an expected doubling of the share of the over-aged population between
1950 and 2000, from 10.4% to 19. 1%. Traditionally, less than 24% of
the pensioners have participated in the labor force, with the average
percentage of those working full time at about 16% of those available
45in 1975. For this reason, most experts have concluded that the vast
pool of pensioners represents only a minimal source of labor input.
However, recent directives issued by the Central Committee are very
likely to produce substantial number of individuals who are willing to
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The reason why few pensioners have chosen to work full time is
that there were legal ceilings on the amount of total income that could
be obtained by a working pensioner. Those pensioners receiving the
minimum pension would generally work part-time to bring their
pension-plus -earnings income to the ceiling figure. Those individuals
receiving the maximum pension of 120 rubles per month had little
incentive to work because of the imposed ceiling. And yet, Soviet
surveys have shown that 80% of pensioners are able-bodied and could
serve as manpower reserves, while no less than 35% are capable of
full time work. When one considers that nearly 3 million workers
are scheduled to retire every year during the 1980's, any measure
which could keep even a minimal percentage of these laborers working
for 2 or 3 years would provide valuable additions to the labor force.
The Central Committee has recently adopted a measure which may
do just that. The Central Committee has extended an offer to those
approaching retirement age to continue working in exchange for an in-
creased pension when they elect to retire. Each year of additional
work will be rewarded with a pension increase of 10 rubles per month,
with the maximum pension-plus -earnings set at 150 rubles per month.





Central Committee of the CPSU, "On Measures to Provide
Material Incentives for Pensioners, " Pravda and Investia , 2 Oct.




"A list of categories of employees who are entitled to receive 50%,
75% or 100% of their designated old-age pensions while working,
but no more than 300 rubles per month when combined with their
earnings, and of certain employees who are entitled to their full




The new policy, which took effect on 1 Jan. 1980, also increases the
ceiling to 300 rubles per month for Great Patriotic War Veterans
and extends the ceiling for other servicemen. It is feasible that this
policy could result in substantial increases to the labor force over the
next several years, serving to offset the negative implications of re-
duced 18-year-old cohorts.
G. EDUCATION, TRAINING AND PLACEMENT
Soviet education policies are moving in a very clearly defined
direction, concentrating upon measures designed to produce trained
industrial specialists at age 16. The primary mechanisms for this
will be vocational-technical schools or schools which combine general
secondary education with industrial skill training. The Soviets have
also implemented policies designed to reduce significantly the number
of individuals attaining higher education. In 1975, the percentage of
secondary school graduates proceeding to higher education was 26%.
Three years later, the figure had dropped to 20%. " It is likely that
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"We are close to totally meeting the need of our economy for
diplomaed personnel.
. .
In a word, life has changed substantially.
Under these conditions, could the secondary schools remain prep-





requires persons not only of different skills but of different levels
of skill. A considerably larger number of assembly line workers.
. .
is needed than engineers, agronomists, teachers, and doctors
. . .
The time has come to bring educational institutions into accord with
changing times. "^
"This means specifically that at age 14 a young person can no longer
remain a schoolchild who is led by the hand and whose parents are
called in if the least little thing occurs. He must become a student
like, say, one at a specialized secondary school a student attending
a trade and technical school that simultaneously provides full second-
ary education."51
"In these conditions, it would seem better to provide all young people
with vocational training in school, giving them both a secondary
education and an occupational specialty. "52
The use of vocational-technical schools will also be used along with
increased instruction in the Russian language to increase the mobility
of Central Asian youth:
"In order to increase the mobility of young people in these areas,
it would be a good idea to step up the development of vocational-
technical schools and other educational institutions that would train
skilled personnel from among the local population and to provide
production training for students at enterprises, construction pro-
jects, and farms in other republics. "53
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The principle vehicle for this migration will be the "Tour-of-Duty"
method whereby vocational-technical school graduates will be "re-
cruited" for work in construction projects or enterprises in Western
Siberia or the Far East, presumably as a "pay-back" duty for educa-
tional stipends. This program removes the young 16-year-old from
his traditional Central Asian environment and "mobilizes" him before
he is likely to acquire a wife and children. Should the individual re-
turn to Central Asia following his "Tour-of-Duty" and his military
service, he will have a valuable skill which will at least encourage
migration to urban areas. The "Tour-of-Duty" settlements are much
less expensive to operate because they can be located at remote pro-
duction facilities (saving on transportation from base-cities) and
because the workers live there without dependents (saving on housing
and essential services). The use of "Tour-of-Duty" labor seems to be
concentrating in the energy and raw materials industries of Western
Siberia:
"Moreover, production units from the European part of the country,
the Northern Caucasus, and Central Asia have been recruited for
the construction of trunk pipelines, compressor stations, and other
facilities in W. Siberia. The expedition method makes it possible
to maneuver labor resources in the branch, and it is taking on an
inter-regional aspect
.
"54 (emphasis is mine)
The use of the expedition o r "Tour-of-Duty" method seems to be one
of the Party's main planks for both the development of Western Siberia
and the increased mobility and training of Central Asian youth. It also
appears that the "Tour-of-Duty" method will assist in managing the
flow of labor into new projects:
$
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. . 73% of the workers to be hired for 313 (RSFSR) major
facilities scheduled for start up in 1978 were supposed to come
from outside. But training and recruitment didn't begin early-
enough to have them there on time
. . . Should consider training
costs as a part of construction and begin specific training programs
during construction. " 55
H. WOMEN
In 1959, the percentage representation of women aged 20-54 years
was 77%, a figure which is very similar to that of most Socialist
countries. However, from 1959-1970, the figure rose 12% to nearly
|
90%, providing a clear indication of the unusually high demand for
56labor during those years. However, when viewed regionally, the
representation of women in the labor force indicates that there is a
potential source of small manpower reserves comprised of Central
Asian women. Nearly 16% of Central Asian manpower is not employed
in social production, a figure which is two times as large as the All-
Union index. Women represent more than 80% of the unemployed in
this group. Thus, the mobilization of this sector could also be
productive. The overall plan may be for Central Asian women to
participate in staffing the new light industries in semi-rural areas
while the trained male graduates of vocational-technical schools
participate in tour-of-duty enterprises and military service. The
short term impact of such a plan is likely to be minimal due to cultural
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Earlier, it was mentioned that the size of the 18-year-old cohorts
may be insufficient to maintain the current size of the Armed Forces
in the 1980's. The number of young men available for the draft (age 18)
will decline from 2. 6 million in 1978 to 2. million in 1986-1988, with
approximately 1.6 million draftees needed each year to maintain the
current force level. It appears at this point that the Soviets are will-
ing to make the required sacrifices to maintain the size of their Armed
Forces including a tightening of deferment policy and more frequent
call-ups of reserves. The fact that a sizable portion of the draftees
will come from Central Asia automatically lowers the number of
educational deferments as Central Asians have historically achieved
lower educational levels than their Soviet counterparts (qualitative;
many Central Asians receive secondary school diplomas, but the
quality is notoriously poor relative to the R.S.F.S.R.) Educational
deferments can be expected to decrease among the Russian youth as
well. The fact that numerous vocational-technical school graduates
will have already worked for two years prior to induction, as well as
increased participation of retirees, will allow the Soviets to maintain
the 1.6 million draft without suffering substantial declines in the ab-
solute size of the labor force, i.e., as 18-year-olds are inducted,
there will be 16 year old vocational-technical school graduates, 60
year old workers who elect not to retire, and 20 year old men who
have completed military service to fill the void in the labor supply.
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There will also be little motivation for the Soviet leadership to
reduce the size of the military for the purpose of injecting labor re-
sources into the economy. With a labor force of over 130M, it
would take a military manpower cut of 25% just to provide a 1% increase
in the labor supply. Such a measure would also be a one time gain only,
providing benefits which are dubious in light of the disproportionate
reduction in military capability. Thus, the Soviets should be able to
maintain the current size of their armed forces despite increasing
competition with the economic sector. The likelihood of their choosing
to reduce force levels under such circumstances appears to be low.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
A. PURPOSE
"Today, the Army remains a tool for the Russification of the
Ukraine and for the whole non-Russian population. "*
It is quite natural for Western analysts to view the Soviet Armed
Forces as having a predominantly external orientation. The military
presumably exists for the protection of the homeland; and policies re-
garding size, structure, and ethnic composition are formulated with the
national defense as the "number one" priority. The enormous size of
the Soviet military sector is generally attributed to the Soviet "paranoia"
for border defense, and its structure and armaments attributed to external
threats. It is for this reason that the 500, 000 man increase in the Soviet
Armed Forces in the late 1960's is almost universally attributed to the
rising level of hostility between the U. S.S.R. and Peoples 1 Republic of
China.
And yet, there is ample evidence to suggest that external concerns
are only one input into the decision-making process regarding military
matters. The Red Army was brought into being following the Revolution
of 1917 and was initially employed for the destruction of those forces
resisting Bolshevik rule. In the early 1920's, Lenin and his associates
forbade the continue existence of National Armies and began to use
some minorities in the Central Army. In 1938, the new military law
Nikolai Shrypnik at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923. Helen




required all Soviet male citizens to participate in compulsory military-
service regardless of nationality or cultural background. The 1967
military law clearly stipulated that compulsory military service had
one predominant aim: the fusion of recruits into multiethnic units
for the purpose of cultural assimilation through the use of the Russian
2language. Thus, the Soviet Armed Forces would appear to be as
much an instrument of national integration as they are a vehicle for
the defense of the country. When viewed in this perspective, the organ-
ization and structure of Soviet forces becomes more logical, and decisions
regarding military conscription are more easily explained.
This perspective allows us to reconsider the military expansion of
the late 1960's in other than external terms. The draft law at the time
specified a service period of three years, which had been the norm
since World War II. In the late 1960's however, the size of the 18 and
19-year-old cohorts was extremely large as a result of increased birth-
rates in the early post-war period. With a length of service of three
years and an induction rate of 80% , the Soviet leadership would have had
to finance a 2 million man increase in the Armed Forces if military
service was to provide universal indoctrination, Russification, and
Leninist socialization for the majority of young males. The result
was the 1967 Military Service Law which stipulated a reduced period of
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leadership continued the policy of near-universal military training
and indoctrination while having to finance an increase of only 500, 000.
This solution appears to indicate as much of a concern for domestic
political considerations as it does for the external military threat.
It is no coincidence that the propogation of the 1967 law on military
service was accompanied by what appears to be a complete militari-
zation of Soviet society, beginning with very young schoolchildren and
utilizing such mechanisms as the publication of "We Pick Up New
Rifles, " a preschool reader containing illustrations of children being
issued rifles and repelling the enemy. It was also in the late 1960's
that the extensive sale of toy guns, missies, tanks, and other military
toys was begun for the first time.
In the 1962 and 1963 editions of Sokolovsky's Soviet Military Strategy
a warning appears that a reduction in the compulsory period of military
service would have adverse effects upon the quality of training and the
level of combat readiness. The phrase was prudently omitted in the
1968 edition. It would appear that at least on some occasions, ideological
and political considerations predominate, even if overall military effect-
iveness is impaired.
The Armed Forces have become a bulwark of the Party's socialization
system and may now be intended as the primary vechicle for the political






"At present, the purpose of ideological work in the Soviet Armed
Forces is to mold Communist convictions and a Marxist-Leninist
World outlook in the personnel. "5
The Main Political Administration is responsible for the "ideological
purity" and "Leninist conviction" of the Soviet forces. Political
officers are found at every level down to the individual company and
receive a substantial proportion of the soldier's time for the purpose
of political indoctrination. Party control of the military is complete
as a result of extreme centralization, the vigilence of the M. P. A. , and
a disproportionate representation of military officers in the C. P. S. U.
and the Y. C. L.
A great deal of attention was focused upon the reduction of the period
of compulsory military service brought about by the 1967 modifications.
The new military law reduced the required period of service from
three years to two years (from four to three years for the Navy) and
lowered the draft age to 18. Actually, very little was changed as the
draft law included a number of other provisions which increased the
amount of pre-induction training so that most recruits could report
directly to their units upon induction.
This increase in pre-induction training was to be accomplished by
D. O. S. A. A. F. (The Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army,
Aviation, and the Fleet). This organization grew rapidly after 1967,
and in 1972 reportedly involved 65M persons, a figure representing
5
Col. V. Orlov, "Evoking a Response, " Soviet Military Review ,
Feb. 1980, p. 38.
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more than 25% of the entire population. ° D. O. S. A. A. F. is staffed
predominantly with retired military personnel although the Ministry
of Education has a great deal of the responsibility for program
management. D.O.S.A.A. F. membership includes men and women
of all ages and provides recreational facilities which normally would
not be available. Regulations specify that a D.O.S.A.A.F. unit must
be organized in each school, and all schoolchildren reaching 14 years
of age are "expected to join. " The purpose of D. O. S. A. A. F. include
"active cooperation for strengthening the military capability of the
country and for preparing workers for the defense of the Socialist
Fatherland, "preparing specialists for the Armed Forces from among
the 17-year-olds who register to be called up the following year;"
conducting basic military training; and publishing books and fostering
activities which create favorable attitudes toward military service. °
Thus, D.O.S.A.A.F. provides political and military training to about
1/3 of the individuals inducted under the Draft. Through the extensive
use of this organization, the Soviet leadership has increased its capa-
bility for political indoctrination and has helped to offset at least a
portion of the reduced effectiveness which may result from the reduct-
ion in the length of compulsory service.
6
William E. Odom, "The Militarization of Soviet Society, " Problems









The C.P. S.U. is remarkably open in its declarations concerning
the political utility of universal military service, especially in the
socialization of non-Russian minorities. In this sense, the fact that
more Central Asian youth will be filling the military roles in the near
future is not necessarily viewed as a "problem" by the central authori-
ties. Military service represents an opportunity to remove the young
Moslem from his traditional family environment and to deploy him in
a new environment which is predominantly Russian. The opportunity
for political indoctrination is immense.
"Lenin's nationalities policy; the policy of equality and the con-
vergence of the working people of all nations and ethnic groups
of the Soviet state; their education in the spirit of friendship of
peoples and proletarian internationalism; is the most important
source for raising the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces. ""
It becomes important then, in the consideration of alternatives
affecting the Soviet military, to bear in mind this dual purpose of the
Soviet forces, for ideological and political concerns seem to receive
as much emphasis as external military threat.
Q
Kuznetsov, "Lenin's Principles of Soviet Military Construction,"




The estimated number of Soviet military men under arms varies
widely depending upon the source which is selected for use. There seems
to be a rough consensus centering around the range of 4-4. 5 million
active personnel in armed units. This consensus is supported by Richard
Holmes, Murray Feshbach, the International Institute of Strategic Studies,
and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Other estimates, however, are
quite prevalent and range anywhere from 3 to 6 million. Table 3-1
illustrates one estimate which provides the distribution of manpower
among the 5 services, the K. G. B. , and M. V. D.
The Soviet military is essentially a cadre system, 25% of which is
composed of career officers, warrant officers, and N. C. O. 's. l The
remaining 75% is composed of 2 year draftees, requiring an annual
intake of nearly 1. 7 million new 18-year-old draftees. The same number
of soldiers are released to the reserves each year, giving the Soviets a
massive capability for rapid mobilization. Scott estimates that the Soviet
Union could mobilize an additional 2 to 3 million men in just 48 hours,
1 2
nearly doubling the size of existing forces.
The period of compulsory service is extremely demanding for the
conscripts and as a result, very few (about 5%) extend their service
1
3
beyond the compulsory period. A conscript's pay is only 4 rubles
10Richard Holmes, "U. S. S. R. , " in John Keegan, ed. , World
Armies 1979
, p. 732.









STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES
Strategic Rocket Forces 375, 000
Ground Forces 1,825,000
Air Defense Forces 550,000
Naval Forces 433,000
Air Force 455, 000
K. G. B. Border Guards 200,000
M. V.D. Security Forces 250, 000
TOTAL 4,088,000*
^Estimates vary greatly with most agencies reporting 4-4. 5M.
Range of other estimates is 3-6M.
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per month, and nearly every minute of the soldier's time, from 6 A.M.
to 10 P.M., is occupied with military or political training. Food and
accomodations are very plain and showers are generally permitted only
once each week. The Officer Corps is highly trained through a system
of military academies and enjoys pay and priviledges which are higher
than those enjoyed by their contemporaries in the civilian sector.
Approximately 90% of all military officers are members of the C. P.S. U.
or Komosomol, and virturally all are members of the Slavic nationali-
ties. l4
The ethnic structure and policies of the Soviet Armed Forces are
not well understood. Czarist military policy excluded nearly 40
nationalities from participation in the military service. Soviet poli-
cies reversed this situation in an official sense, but it is doubtful that
substantial numbers of Central Asians and other minorities were utilized
in the regular forces. In the 1940's, the Central Asian nationalities
constituted only 4. 6% of the draft, and by the 1950's, this figure had
risen to only 6.6%. l ° Enders Wimbush maintains that Central Asians
have traditionally not been trusted and, as a result, have been assigned
14
Interview with P. H. Vigor, British Defense Analyst, September
1980. Also supported by Murray Feshbach and Steven Rapaway.
15
Col. A. Solovyov, "Army of Internationalists, " Soviet Military
Review , Feb. 1980, pp. 2-4.
Ann Sheehy, "Language Problems in the Soviet Armed Forces, "
Radio Liberty Research, RL 196/78, September 11, 1978.
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primarily to construction units. 17 P. H. Vigor maintains that some
qualified Central Asians are utilized in the regular forces, but that
they are distributed widely so that few will serve together in the same
unit. l8
Recent reports in Western news sources report increased incidents
of "name calling" and fights between members of the different ethnic
19groups. This reported increase in the level of ethnic tension may
be an early indication of rising utilization of Moslem minorities in the
regular forces. The structure and utilization of the numerous Central
Asian minorities which will have to be brought into the regular forces
in the near future will become a particularly important issue as other
sources of manpower dry up. Table 3-2 recaps the regional distri-
bution of estimated increments to the population in the able-bodied ages
in the U. S. S. R.
,
R. S. F. S. R.
, Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and the
20Transcaucasus, 1971-2000.
17
S. Enders Wimbush, as quoted in Time
,
23 June 1980, p. 31.
18Interview with P. H. Vigor, Sept. 1980.





"Pending Manpower Problems noted," Soviet World Outlook , 15
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Given the extreme reduction in the upcoming size of 18-year-old
cohorts in the 1980's and the disproportionate representation of Turko-
Moslems from Central Asia and the Caucasus, it appears that the Soviet
leadership will have to make substantial choices concerning the size,
organization, and ethnic composition of its Armed Forces. The most
likely alternatives are: a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces;
adjustments in the length of compulsory military service; structural
changes encouraging more re-enlistments following the initial period
of service; or maximum use of minority elements with increased Party
control. Each alternative will be considered separately.
D. FORCE REDUCTIONS
Manpower shortages and economic -military tradeoffs may force
the Soviets to reduce the size of their Armed Forces for the remainder
of the century. Such a reduction may be necessitated for three reasons:
an absolute shortage of 18-year-old males, the desire to maintain a
larger civilian labor force, and a lingering mistrust of Central Asians.
As discussed previously, Feshbach and Rapaway predicted in 1976
that unless existing policies were changed, the Soviet Union would not
be able to maintain its current force level of 4. 0-4. 5 million. However,
their calculations were based upon 1976 deferment policies which appear
to have been tightened substantially in the intervening years, e.g.
Feshbach and Rapaway's educational deferments allowed for as much
as 26. 5% of the 18-year-olds to defer service until completion of their
education and assumed that medical deferments would take up another
10% of the available male youth. As discussed earlier, the leadership
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appears to have tightened up educational deferments with 20% probably-
representing a maximum figure. The effect of this shift from 26. 5%
to about 20% in the year 1986, e. g. , will provide more than 120, 000
more males for the draft, essentially making up the small shortages
predicted by Feshbach and Rapaway. Given the fact that western
analysts face substantial obstacles in pinpointing the size of the Soviet
military, the reductions which are likely to occur will be hardly detect-
able and will have little substantial impact upon the overall size of
Soviet relative to Western forces.
The fact that the military will have to induct nearly all of the avail-
able 18-year-olds to avoid shortages is not necessarily viewed as a
crucial problem by the Soviet authorities. The military provides the
beneficial services of ideological socialization and Russification; also
assisting in the development of Russian language ability and perhaps
increasing Central Asian mobility. For most nationalities, the 1970
census indicated that knowledge of the Russian language was more
prevalent in the 20-29 age group than in the 16-19 age group. Ann
Sheehy maintains that at least part of this gain must be attributed to
military service, which provides the Russian language environment
7 1
that is so crucial to the development of language skills. The military
also provides valuable technological skills which allow servicemen to
perform productively in the civilian economy following their period of




compulsory service. It is clear that the Soviets are adapting educational
programs and new retirement policies designed to alleviate or minimize
the impact of a continued high draft upon the economy.
There are also some indications of an increase in the number of
female volunteers occupying positions as nurses and clerks. Whereas
Feshbach and Rapaway cited a figure of only about 600 females in the
military, more current sources including Harriet and William Scott
maintain that there are probably about 10, 000 women in uniform.
The use of increased numbers of women to make up for shortfalls in
military manpower is not a viable solution as women are used exten-
sively in the labor force. And, young women completing their schooling
will be one of the major sources of labor as a greater percentage of the
male population is inducted for military service. There appear to be
no major plans for utilization of more women in the Armed Forces.
Present educational policy for girls participating in D. O. S. A. A. F.
stresses first aid rather than combat skills.
It cannot be doubted that competition for manpower will be intense
and that some shortfalls may exist. However, these shortfalls will be
minimal relative to the immense size of the force and are likely to
have little impact upon the military capability of the nation.
Reductions in the size of the military sector for the purpose of
stimulating the economy are not likely in the years ahead. Despite






maintained an enormous share of the economic resources of the nation.
Many sources, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, indicate
the military will account for 16% of total G. N. P. by 1985. This shows
a remarkable commitment to the military, indicating a preference for
military strength over increased consumption. It is unlikely that the
Soviets would willingly reduce military manpower, as construction
underway already indicates that at least the current manpower level
will be necessary. Recent reports of the construction of four nuclear
powered aircraft carriers for the Navy illustrate the continued demand
for manpower. (U.S. Carriers maintain a crew of about 5,000 sailors).
As mentioned earlier, the military actually represents a rather small
source of manpower for the more than 135 million worker labor force.
Substantial reductions in the size of the Armed Forces would provide
minimal increases to the labor force. Thus, any voluntary reductions
do not appear likely and would require the adoption of political orient-
ations which are wholly uncharacteristic of those observable at the
present time.
Wimbush believes that Central Asians have traditionally not been
trusted, and for this reason, many have been assigned to the unarmed
paramilitary organizations such as construction units. With manpower
shrinking and the Central Asians making up over a third of the available
resources (including the Transcaucasus) this is a luxury which the Soviets
can no longer afford. With the demographic explosion of the South and the
apparent rise in both nationalism and economic leverage it is likely that
the Soviets will upgrade the integrative function of the military, utilizing
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compulsory service to improve upon Central Asian socialization and
to impart skills which will be useful in the civilian sector.
AH things considered, then, a reduction in the size of the Armed
Forces does not appear likely. Those technically skilled individuals
most valuable to the economy are also essential to the military capa-
bility of the nation. Current construction and investment plans demonstrate
a continued preferential position for the military relative to other sectors.
Although Feshbach and Rapaway may be right in hypothesizing upcoming
shortages, the shortages are likely to be quite small, difficult to detect,
and will have little impact upon the overall size, strength, or capability
of the military.
E. INCREASED PERIOD OF COMPULSORY SERVICE
Another available option is to lengthen the period of compulsory
service so that fewer draftees would be needed each year. In 1967,
when the period of compulsory service was shortened, nearly 50%
fewer draftees were required each year. With a draftee force of some
3.2 million men, a one year extension of the required service period
would mean a yearly reduction of some 600, 000 men to maintain the
current force level. This would be a substantial savings of manpower
resources for the economy.
Jeffrey Record maintains that the reduction in the required term
of service in 1967 was brought about principally by concerns on the
part of the Party leadership for the level of technical training with which
young Soviets enter the labor force. 23 The term of service was apparently
23
Jeffrey Record, Sizing Up the Soviet Army
,
(Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1975), p. 10.
95

reduced to allow more manpower to be trained for the civilian economy.
The Soviet press is full of literature which emphasizes the poor quality
of technical training in the schools, most of which cites the waste of
valuable time and resources in providing on-the-job training in the
production environment. The recent drive for vocational-technical
shcools and general secondary schools which graduate fully trained
specialists at age 16 is probably a decisive response to this situation
which may eventually lessen the importance of the military's role as an
"industrial trainer. " In the short term, however, the leadership's
desire to utilize military service for both political and technical train-
ing will probably necessitate the maintenance of the current two year
period of compulsory service. By keeping the period of service at two
years, the Party can not only provide political, linguistic, and technical
training for young Central Asians, but it can also keep them employed,
avoiding the buildup of a vast number of unemployed agricultural
laborers in the Southern Tier. Such a buildup represents a potential
danger to the central leadership because it may lead to increased de-
mands for economic investment (which may not be within its capability
to provide) or serve as a source of increased discontent and ethnic
tension.
The simulataneous pursuit of an educational program producing
technically competent workers at age 16 and an increased period of
military service are essentially incompatible. A 1979 survey by N. N.
Yefimov of Moscow State University indicated that attitudes toward
military service varied greatly, depending upon the age of the individual
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at induction. 24 The reason given for this is that older inductees had
already "mapped out" their lives and that military service was inter-
fering with their personal career plans. To the extent that the leadership
is successful in producing large numbers of competent workers at age 16,
the more likely it is that military service will be increasingly viewed as
a gross interference. In this atmosphere, extension of the term of
service would be extremely sensitive politically and would likely result
in poor morale within the ranks of the inductees. Military service is
already quite unpopular, even with European youth, and may be in-
tolerable if a lengthened period is forced upon Central Asian inductees.
A related option is to voluntarily increase the average length of service
by encouraging vast numbers of inductees to re-enlist following their
compulsory service. As previously mentioned, only about 6% of Soviet
soldiers remain in the service following the required tour. This is
predominantly the result of miserably low pay and harsh living conditions.
An increase in the number of re-enlistees would require a great increase
in the share of wages in the defense budget and would also require sub-
stantial investments for housing and base services. This alternative
could only be considered if funds were to be drawn away from military
construction, an unlikely prospect at best. Both this option and the in-
creased service requirement would also reduce the annual input into the
reserve forces, a system in which the Soviets place enormous emphasis.
24
N. N. Yefimov, Sotsiologicheskiye issledovania , No. 1, Jan. -









F. MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIANS
The remaining alternative is the maximum utilization of the large
Central Asian cohorts in the regular forces. In fact, the current force
level can only be maintained with extensive utilization of Central Asians,
because they will provide a major source of youthful manpower in the
decades ahead. By the year 2000, nearly 35% of all available draft
age manpower will be located in Central Asia and the Caucasus. "
The exercise of this option would likely require increased supervision
on the part of the Main Political Administration, as it would bring less
socialized elements of a vastly different culture into the regular forces.
The increasing references in Soviet military journals to nationality issues
and the increasing importance of Party-Political work may serve to demon'
strate that the current policy of the leadership has, in fact, swung over
to the full utilization of Central Asian and other minorities.
"In accordance with the U. S. S. R. law of universal military service
today, all male citizens of the U. S. S. R.
,
irrespective of racial
and national affiliation, religion, education, residence, social and
property status, are bound to serve the colours in the ranks of the
Soviet Armed Forces. "2o
Thus, one can expect to see increasing numbers of Central Asian
conscripts in the regular forces in the decade ahead. The full utilization
of Soviet Central Asians is necessitated by manpower shortages in the
25Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit.
, p. 148.




regions which traditionally have provided the manpower for the Armed
Forces and has numerous advantages over alternative policy options.
They include:
1. The opportunity to remove Central Asian youth from their
traditional environment and to subject them to an intense pro-
gram of socialization, Russification, and technical training.
2. Temporarily employs young Central Asian males who may
otherwise remain unemployed and unskilled in the labor-surplus
Southern regions.
3. Provides useful technological skills valuable to the civilian
industries of Central Asia and provides additional Russian
language experience.
4. Allows the U.S.S.R. to maintain near-universal military train-
ing under a 2 year requirement and maintains the Armed Forces
at 4-4. 5 million.
5. May serve to increase the mobility of Central Assian youth.
This incorporation of more Central Asians into the regular forces will
likely be accompanied by an increase in Party-Political work and in
bureaucratic supervision of deferments, promotions, admission to
military academies, and approval of requests for extended service. It
is not clear how ethnic balances will be managed, but if traditional
practices are followed, the Central Asians are likely to be dispersed to
the greatest extent possible. Full participation in the military services
combined with increasing assertiveness on the part of Central Asian
elites is likely to result in a greater representation of qualified Central
Asians in the Officer Corps, although it will probably be years before




If this final alternative is, in fact, the preferred selection of the
Party elite, it will substantially affect the readiness and quality of the
Soviet forces in the decades ahead. Increased utilization of Central
Asian minorities may be beneficial from the standpoint of political
indoctrination, but its impact upon the capabilities, loyalty, and motiv-
ation of the men comprising the Armed Services is likely to be negative.
It has been shown that the majority of Central Asian youth are less
than adequately skilled in the Russian language, receive a poor quality
education relative to their European contemporaries, and live in a more
traditional and less technically oriented society. It is not, therefore,
surprising to hear reports that the influx of Central Asian minorities
into the Soviet Navy has been accompanied by poor relations between
ethnic groups and involves a high cost in training time and effort to main-
27
tain the Navy. Although most Central Asians may understand enough
Russian to decipher basic military commands, the ability of most to
read and understand military technical manuals is likely to be minimal.
Recent attention to this problem has surfaced in the Soviet Press.
Russky yazyk v nation'noi shkole reports a speech by F. L. Saubanova
at the Uzbek Teachers' Congress which deals specifically with the
impact of poorly trained Central Asians entering the military:
27
Captain W. Manthorpe, "The Influence of Being Russian on the
Officers and Men of the Soviet Navy, " U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ,





But unfortunately, because they had inadequate training
in Russian, not all of them can perform their military service
successfully. Poor knowledge of Russian makes it difficult to
learn military regulations, and acquire a military specialty, and
this in turn adversely affects the combat readiness of soldiers.
It takes them longer than their comrades to pass the tests to carry
out guard duties independently or to obtain the certificate for main-
taining a piece of equipment. It is difficult for them to acquire the
skills to operate the powerful weapons and complex modern equip-
ment that are in the arsenal of the Soviet Army. "^8
U.S. commanders are well familiar with the difficulties faced by
soldiers who enter the service without a thorough foundation in linguistic
skills. Written procedures for such simple operations as reliability
tests on optical sighting instruments become extremely difficult for
soldiers who have not obtained sufficient reading levels. The linguistic
skills possessed by these individuals, however, are many times greater
than those possessed by Central Asian minorities entering the Soviet
Armed Forces. The 1972 Russian primer for soldiers with little know-
ledge of Russian aims primarily:
"to provide the minimum needed to understand commands and orders
and the expressions most commonly used in military life, and to
read and conduct simple conversations in Russian. "29
When one considers that more than 1/3 of the Soviet military draftees
in the 1980's will possess such poor skills in the Russian language, it
becomes evident that the Soviet forces will suffer a significant decline
in readiness and capability. Those areas of operations most affected
28






are likely to be weapons system maintenance, fire direction, target
acquisition, and flexible tactical employment in fluid situations.
Many soldiers will fail to perform their military service satisfactorily,
and many will leave the service without mastering a military specialty.
Increased allotments of time for more political or Russian language
training represent a direct subtraction from the amount of time available
for combat training. The net impact of this can only be a dilution of
the Armed Forces' quality through the creation of a conscript force
composed of individuals with limited technical skill. The time available
may result in a soldier's knowing how to fire a particular weapon system,
but the prospect of many troops acquiring an understanding of maintenance
procedures or tactical employment is not likely. The combined effect
of these very substantial shortcomings of Central Asian youth in the
absorption of military skills will be substantial and will certainly impact
upon the other members of the unit. Time spent with even a small per-
centage of the unit's members is time which is no longer available to the
unit as a whole. Thus, Soviet officers will spend more time and energy
in unit training activities, and will likely receive a poorer return in
terms of combat readiness.
But lower skill levels may be only one aspect of the problems to be
encountered as a result of minority integration into the Armed Forces.
Serious deficiences are also likely to be experienced in the crucial areas
of loyalty and motivation.
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The Central Asian recruit will find himself in a predominantly-
Russian environment where ethnic tensions are likely to be high. His
failure to communicate well in the Russian language and his ethnic
dissimilarities will serve to set him apart, eliminating the sense of
comradeship which makes military burdens bearable. Abuzyarov
reports that:
"This is all bound to affect the morale of servicemen; poor know-
ledge of Russian often leads to depression and sometimes engenders
a negative attitude towards military service. "30
With little access to career advancement and with military doctrine
and organization geared to a "foreign" culture, it is difficult to see how
these substantial numbers of Moslem recruits will remain loyal in
difficult times or how they will be motivated to do anything more than
is necessary to survive. Current and projected programs designed to
improve the technical and linguistic skills of Central Asians prior to
induction may serve to heighten the antagonism with which these minori'
ties face military service; for it is these very programs which will
allow him to establish a productive life of his own: a life which must
now be interrupted for military service.
Thus, the most significant impact of demographic trends upon the
Soviet Armed Forces seems to be qualitative rather than quantitative.
It is the reduction in military capability and morale rather than a pot-





Soviet forces. In the sophisticated era of the 1990's, it will still be
man who dominates the battlefield and controls the destiny of nations.
It will be in this essential sector, the human sector, that the Soviet
Union may be weak.
At this point, it becomes necessary to consider the reliability of
future Soviet Central Asian soldiers in offensive operations abroad.
Not only are there questions as to the capabilities and morale of these
soldiers, but also one must question the degree of loyalty which such
conscripts will display in difficult situations.
It seems clear that unit cohesion will suffer as a result of increased
ethnic diversity in the regular forces. A 1972 article in Kommunist
vooruzhennykh sil mentions the case of soldiers who began to shun
their comrades as a result of ridicule inflicted upon them because of
poor Russian language ability. To the extent that military service
represents a recruit's first exposure to a predominantly Russian en-
vironment, compulsory service may form long term resentments which
affect the attitude of Central Asian soldiers toward the Slavic center.
The obvious scenario where one might suspect a lack of reliability
among Central Asian soldiers would be the use of Soviet forces in Iran
or Afghanistan where ethnic, linguistic, and religious ties between
Soviet Central Asians and the local population are strong. The loyalty






upon a delicate balance of sympathies for and identification with the
local populations on the one hand, and the economic benefits and physical
security of remaining loyal on the other. It is clear that the Soviet Union
initially used some Central Asian soldiers in the 1979 invasion of
Afghanistan for the obvious propaganda benefits (fraternal assistance),
as well as the utilization of the advantages which accrue to soldiers
who possess familiarity with the climate, terrain, and local language.
Jiri Valenta reports that soldiers of Central Asian origin were replaced
by Russians or withdrawn to barracks after the invasion because of re-
32ported refusals to fight the Afghans. Although such reports are
difficult to substantiate, there is at least a basis for suspicion as to
the reliability of Soviet Central Asian soldiers in combat against ethnic
brothers. Of particular concern is the degree to which rising Islamic
fervor in Soviet Central Asia will inhibit these soldiers from participating
in combat against Moslem brethren of similar ethnic origin.
The same characteristics which make these soldiers potentially
unreliable in a South Asian scenario may serve to increase reliability
against N.A.T.O. (or rebellious Warsaw Pact) forces in Europe. The
lack of any cultural similarities with West Europeans or Americans as
well as limited knowledge (heavily colored by pro-Soviet propaganda)
would tend to increase the identification with Russians rather than other
32
J. Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion,
International Security, Fall 1980, p. 138.
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Europeans. In commenting upon the use of "a considerable number" of
Soviet troops from Central Asia in the second intervention of the 1956
Hungarian Crisis, the U.S. committee which investigated the intervention
stated that:
"It would seem that the Soviet authorities had more confidence in
troops who had had no opportunity to be affected by European
associations and who might be counted on to behave with indifference
to the attitude of the Hungarian people. DJ
However, the degree of confidence may not have been great as these
Central Asian forces were led to believe that they were in Egypt, with
the mission of fighting the Anglo-French imperialists. Conversely,
it is precisely in this scenario where the limited capabilities of Central
Asian soldiers will most likely subject them to defeat by a more tech-
nically competent opponent.
Although such discussions must remain highly speculative at this
early point of Central Asian utilization, it does appear that the necessity
of using more Central Asians in the regular forces provides numerous
uncertainties for the central leadership in making decisions concerning
their use. Not only must Soviet leaders content themselves with low
technical capability and morale, but also with the potential for problems
in the areas of cohesion and reliability. In those scenarios where Central
Asian soldiers would be most effective relative to their opponents, their
reliability is potentially low. Conversely, in scenarios where Central




Asian reliability may be high, the ability to carry out successful
military operations may be low. Although demographics will not
determine the formulation of future military or foreign policy, it is
clear that these variables will likely affect the achievements which
such policies might hope to obtain.
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V. NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
A. U.S.S.R.
The implications of demographic trends for Soviet national
security policy are likely to be numerous, particularly in the decade
ahead when manpower resources for the military and the economy
begin a rapid decline to unprecedented levels. The major develop-
ments impacting upon the decision-making process will be intense
competition for scarce human resources between the economic and
military sectors, greater reliance upon less skilled Central Asian
manpower for the maintenance of military force levels, and increased
leverage in interest articulation on the part of Central Asian elites.
Much has been said about the effects of continued high military
expenditures upon the Soviet economy. The debate has centered
around the prospects for increasing military expenditures in light of
decreasing levels of investment capital, increased energy scarcity,
and rising demands for the production of consumer goods. In the
future, development of the military sector will also require an in-
ordinate share of available manpower resources, including over 70%
of each year's cohort of 18 year-old-youths. Although short term
reductions in the size of the military force are not forecasted, it seems




Current force levels will most likely be maintained at the expense of
exacerbating existing manpower shortages. Force expansion created
through the mobilization of reserves will draw productive workers
away from industry, with extremely low availability of unused labor
to fill the void.
The influx of Central Asian youth into the regular forces will
certainly result in diminished technical capabilities, responsiveness,
morale, and perhaps reliability in South Asian scenarios. With nearly
35% of each conscript class composed of Central Asian recruits of
limited linguistic and technical talents, the ability of the Soviets to
maintain a high quality, modern force capable of conducting successful
operations against Western forces is diminished. Such considerations
may serve to qualify the edge obtained through quantitative predominances,
although the degree of diminished capability is not clear. To the extent
that Soviets are able to funnel Central Asian manpower into occupational
specialties requiring fewer technical or linguistic skills, and to limit
the impact of heightened ethnic tension on unit morale; the resultant
effect upon unit readiness may not be great. The likelihood of complete
success in this endeavor would not seem high, considering the increasing
complexity of weapon systems. The combined effect of these deficiencies
may be to increase the uncertainties involved in the decision to use military
force, particularly in large scale conflicts.
The previously noted enhancement of leverage in the articulation of
Central Asian interests by local elites (as a result of the demographic
explosion) illustrates the initiation of changes in domestic political
balances which may impact upon national security considerations.
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More so than in previous decades, Central Asia has become important
to the future economic development of the Soviet state, as this region
will provide the only meaningful increments to labor supplies for the
development of West Siberian resource industries. As such, the
central authorities are likely to pay more attention to international
events which may affect the political stability of the Southern Tier.
It is somewhat simplistic to argue that the Party leadership is
concerned about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism leading to counter-
revolution in Soviet Central Asia. However, it seems clear that Moscow
is concerned about the rising confidence and militancy of the Islamic
movement, and fears that Islamic successes in the nations bordering
the Soviet South could fuel Central Asian demands for greater autonomy,
political participation, religious and cultural freedom, and regional
investment. As the Southern Tier becomes increasingly necessary for
Soviet economic development, events in Iran, Afghanistan, and other
bordering Islamic nations may take on increased significance for the
Soviet concept of security. Just as the emergence of nationalistic trends
in the non-Russian Soviet republics contributed to the intervention in
Czechoslovakia in 1968, the fear of the effects of pan-Islamic tendencies
in Soviet Central Asia may have contributed to the Afghan intervention
of 1979. In the future, Soviet foreign policy toward South Asia will
surely encounter the dilemna of posing as friend to the Islamic nations




The U.S. has entered the decade of the 80' s with the clearly ex-
pressed desire of upgrading its military forces. And yet, the particular
structure which these forces are to take has yet to be clearly defined.
The considerations discussed above may provide meaningful input
into the debate concerning the nature and structure of future U.S.
military forces.
U.S. analysts have often expressed grave concerns over the
enormous size of the Soviet Armed Forces. It must be remembered,
however, that Soviet military forces serve domestic as well as inter-
national roles and that demographic trends are likely to produce a
lower capability than would otherwise be expected of a force this size.
In assessing Soviet intentions, it must be noted that the size of the
Soviet military is partly the result of the Party's desire to provide
universal political indoctrination to Soviet youth. Also, increasing
representation of Central Asians in the regular forces of the 1980's
will most likely create morale and quality problems which will surely
attenuate the combat readiness of Soviet units.
In assessing U.S. military readiness, great notice is taken of
even the smallest flaws in both the quantity and quality of existing
manpower' resources. Recent concerns for the low educational level
of U.S. recruits and the inability to fill authorized billets are said to
have serious implications for the level of military capability. And
yet, U.S. manpower shortages are predominantly the result of the
failure to provide adequate pay incentives for a voluntary force or to
undertake the reinstitution of compulsory service, and are not the
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result of absolute manpower shortages. Should there be a necessity
for massive mobilization, the U.S. has an enormous reserve of unused
labor (primarily female) capable of assuming vacated positions. In
contrast, current Soviet force levels utilize nearly all of the Soviet's
available manpower, and mobilization of reserves can be accomplished
only by stripping the economy bare.
This analysis would suggest that current U.S. manpower levels will
be adequate to meet the Soviet challenge, provided that authorized
billets are filled and modernization continues. A smaller, leaner,
more capable force with excellent transport and first line weaponry
will be a more than adequate deterrent to Soviet expansion. The necessity
for massive regular force additions recommended by some does not
appear to be acute. Furthermore, recent efforts by the U.S. Army
leadership to concentrate their efforts upon measures for the strenth-
ening of unit cohesion and morale (modified regimental system and
assignment stability) may some day pay handsome dividends against a
Soviet force in which good morale may be a scarce commodity.
Even a cursory review of Soviet mobilization capabilities reveals
a phenomenal ability to funnel massive amounts of trained manpower
into the reserve forces. Furthermore the superstructure for the
mobilization may be decisive. Historically, the Soviets have not hesi-
tated to use reserve forces as evidenced in Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Afghanistan.
In contrast, the U.S. capability to rapidly mobilize and deploy
millions of reservists appears quite limited. A clear priority for the
1980's should be the improvement of reserve forces as well as the up-
grading of mobilization functions. Without compulsory service, it is
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evident that the U. S. cannot hope to match the Soviet achievement in
the area of reserve mobilization. However, there is much room for
improvement even under the current system of voluntary service.
The recent promulgation of the Carter doctrine has committed the
U.S. to the military defense of U.S. interests in the Persion Gulf
region. In the application of this doctrine, particularly toward Iran,
it must be remembered that Soviet interests are also great and will
likely result in Soviet reaction to U.S. initiatives in the region. Not
only are the Soviet leaders concerned about the obvious security im-
lications for their southern border, but also they must be watchful for
developments in the region which might tend to increase the assertiveness
of Moslem populations in the border regions of Soviet Central Asia.
Those who insist that Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf are less
intense than our own because of little dependence upon Arab oil may
be neglecting important Soviet domestic variables which have histori-




This analysis has examined Soviet military manpower management
in detail and has concluded that serious challenges face the Soviet
leadership in the maintenance of military capabilities through the re-
mainder of this century. These challenges include the shortage of youthful
manpower for compulsory service, serious technical and morale problems
as a result of the influx of poorly qualified Central Asian recruits, and
the inability to mobilize reserve forces without irreversibly damaging
industrial production capacity. There are significant "chinks" in the
Soviet armor which the U.S. can successfully exploit in the decade of the
1980's to redress the current military balance. Serious, well planned
modernization accompanied by the application of sound manpower and
mobilization policies can result in the creation of a military force which
is second to none. Whether or not the U.S. successfully addresses its
military position vis a vis the Soviet Union will be largely a matter of
commitment. The challenge posed by the Soviet military expansion of
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